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Political Risk Management in International Construction Projects 
 
This research examines the micro-political risks affecting international construction 
projects in Namibia and whether these risks are effectively managed. A case study 
research design was used for the study and the findings were that  key threat risks 
identified in this context were repudiation, contract problems, labour unrest, hostile 
press, delay in permit approvals  while  local ownership requirements and expatriate 
labour restrictions are both threat and opportunity risks. It further emerged that 
qualitative (heuristic) techniques were commonly used in an ad hoc fashion for risk 
assessment and that the risk management strategy of cooperation was the most 
preferred. In addition, evidence suggests that the execution phase is most prone to 
micro political risk.  
 
A significant number of the micro-political risks identified arise from the host 
government, while the balance arise from the host society. These findings are likely to 
apply to other international construction projects in Namibia and have serious 
implications for the role of government in the success or failure of infrastructural 
projects which are badly needed for national development. Therefore, the Namibian 
Government can positively contribute through introduction of regulations, laws or 
amendments to laws that enhance opportunities, minimise downside risk, and thereby 
reduce overall construction costs on international construction projects in the country. 
  
It is recommended that systematic risk management in which both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques are used for risk assessment, be adopted in dealing with micro 
political risks associated with international construction projects in Namibia. 
Additionally, tertiary institutions offering risk management training need to focus on 
qualitative methods to facilitate maximum benefit when these methods are applied by 
their graduates. The existence of both threats and opportunities in the micro-political 
risk environment in international construction means contractors in international 
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This research examines political risk management in international construction projects. 
For a construction company, as with any other business, risk is an inherent part of the 
business (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003; Zhao and Duan, 2008; Garrido et al., 2011). In the 
home country a company, deals with market-related and project-specific risks only. 
However, in cross-border projects, a foreign construction company has to contend with 
more complex risks with political risk being the most prominent (Robock, 1971; Kobrin, 
1979; Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Alon and Herbert, 2009; 
Zhang and Wei, 2012; Loo et al., 2013). Apart from a lack of consensus on what political 
risk is, it has been argued that political risks are difficult to assess and manage owing to 
their subjective and qualitative nature (Smith and Gannon, 2008). International 
construction projects are exposed to financial loss, schedule overruns and other negative 
outcomes as consequences of these political risk (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2012). 
 
The World Bank (2014) indicated that, in 2012, 22% of the world’s US$ 72.91 trillion GDP 
was made up of gross fixed capital formation.  Gross fixed capital formation is made up 
almost entirely of construction projects (World Bank 2014). Since the profession of project 
management is inherently involved in the realisation of these projects it follows that project 
management acts as a significant contributor to value creation globally (Bredillet, 2010). 
Some of these construction projects are done by companies within their country of origin 
while a substantial number are done by foreign entities through either wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or joint ventures (Daniels et al., 1985; Bing and Tiong, 1999; Shen et al., 
2001; Ozorhon et al., 2007). Those construction projects undertaken in another country  by 
a foreign company  are called international construction projects (Ngowi et al., 2005). The 
removal of trade barriers between nations or world regions through the signing of bilateral 
or multilateral agreements, such as the protocols of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
has resulted in the phenomenon of globalisation. For construction companies it means 
bidding for and engaging in construction work in markets outside the political borders of 
the domicile of the company (Ngowi et al., 2005). 
 
The Engineering News Record (ENR) reported that in 2013,their top 250 construction 
companies in the world had US$ 543.97 billion revenue from outside their countries of 




from revenue generation, there are many other reasons why construction companies get 
involved in cross-border markets. Among the reasons are that, international work improves 
a nation’s trade balance, it allows capitalising on company expertise and experience, 
enables spreading of financial risk and balancing of workload where home market 
construction work is cyclic (Han et al., 2005). Another attractive factor is the profit rates of 
international construction which are higher than for domestic contracts despite the higher 
risks involved (Han et al., 2005). Notwithstanding the positive contributions of international 
construction, to both home and host country and project, international construction projects 
are prone to greater risks than domestic projects. 
 
The PMI (2013) defines risk as an uncertain event or condition whose occurrence will 
affect project goals. Risks can either be negative or positive (opportunities) and project risk 
management aims to minimise if not eliminate the downside effects of negative risks while 
optimising on opportunities (PMI, 2013). When risks are categorized, they become easier 
to understand and therefore to deal with (Hillson, 2003).  
 
Construction risks can be grouped in several ways as there is not a universally agreed 
method of risk categorization (Bing and Tiong, 1999; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Al Khattab 
et al., 2007). Han and Diekmann (2001) classify international construction risks into five 
categories namely, political, economic, cultural/legal, technical and other special risks, 
while Shen et al. (2001) classified risks as financial, managerial, legal, market, policy and 
political and technical risks. These risks are further divided according to source into 
internal and external risks. External risks arise from sources outside the organisation’s 
operations while internal risks emanate from within the organisation. External and internal 
risks are further broken into controllable and uncontrollable subcategories. Controllable 
risks in both subcategories if identified early enough in the project can be eliminated by 
applying the correct techniques but uncontrollable risks cannot be controlled and will 
require close and continuous monitoring and mitigation measures (Lam et al., 2007; 
Sharma, 2013).  
 
Political risks are classified as external risk factors as they are driven by activities outside 
the company or project (Loo et al., 2013; Sharma, 2013).They are  further divided into 
macro and micro level risks (Robock, 1971; Simon, 1982; Hastak and Shaked, 2000). The 
construct of political risk is broad and influenced by a variety of environmental factors and 




other countries as well (Al Khattab et al., 2007; Alon and Herbert, 2009; Crăciun, 2011; 
Howell, 2014). In the past political risk was viewed as emanating from an adversarial 
attitude of the host government but of late the source of these risks is considered 
environmental rather than emanating only from government actions (Fitzpatrick, 1983; 
Alon and Herbert, 2009). Naturally countries can be subjected to innumerable internal and 
external pressures, any combination of which could result in actions being taken that could 
impact on the business environment (Simon, 1984; Alon and Herbert, 2009; Howell, 2014). 
To that end political risks arise from changes or discontinuities in the business arena due 
to political activities and or societal events and these risks are imposed upon an 
international project (Howell, 2001;as cited by Al Khattab et al., 2007).  
 
The three components of political risk are, discontinuity in business environment, difficulty 
in anticipating the business environment and risks originating from political change 
(Robock, 1971). To constitute political risk, the changes in the business environment must 
have the likelihood to affect project performance and therefore, crucially, political risks for 
one company differ from those of another (Robock, 1971). Robock (1971) however warns 
that a political risk forecaster should not rely on a snapshot of events in determining risk 
sources for a particular activity but must analyse the continuously evolving situation over 
time. 
 
Practioners and researchers  have not yet come to an agreement  on a standard definition 
of political risk as study after study offers different and sometimes conflicting perspectives 
(Fitzpatrick, 1983; Prakash and Luther, 1986; Ekpenyong and Umoren, 2010). Various 
definitions of political risk have been given; a few of which are:  
 
Political risk is the probability of changes in the political environment that may render 
the project unviable or increase the probability of failing to achieve profits in a foreign 
country (Kobrin, 1979; and Rice and Mahmoud, 2014);  
 
Political risk is the likelihood of governmental or societal actions or policies 
emanating within or without the country that may result in reduced performance of 
either a select industry or several industries, or endanger a project (Simon, 1982 





Political risk is the likelihood of political forces causing major changes in the 
business environment leading to a company failing to meet investment goals (Hill, 
2002; as cited by Shahid and Hood, 2004);  
 
Political risk is the likelihood of political decisions and political and societal events in 
a country that alter the business arena in such ways that business will make less or 
no profit at all (Howell, 2001; as cited by Ekpenyong and Umoren, 2010; Al Khattab 
et al., 2007); and  
 
Political risk is related to events or conditions that emanate from political activities 
and cause positive or negative impacts on project objectives  (Ling and Hoang, 
2010). 
 
Robock (1971) distinguished between macro and micro-political risks. He explains that 
macro political risks are general and affect all foreign business whereas micro-political risk 
are market or project specific (Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Ling and Hoang, 2010). The 
concept of macro and micro-political risks started by Robock (1971) was taken a step 
further when Alon and Herbert, (2009) defined micro-political risks as arising from 
uncertainty  borne out of outcomes  or events of political processes with the likelihood of 
specific positive or negative consequences on the performance of a firm or project. This 
study adopts this micro-political risk definition as it examines the management of political 
risk at project level. Macro political risks would include revolutions, civil wars, nationwide 
strikes, protests, riots, and mass expropriations. Targeted expropriations, discriminatory 
taxes, and import restrictions applied to a specific firm or project are examples of micro-
political risks (Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Han and Diekmann, 2001; Wang et al., 2004; 
Pheng et al., 2009; Ling and Hoang, 2010; Sharma, 2013). 
 
Daniels et al. (1985) interpret the response to political risk assessment outcomes as the 
management of the political risks. Political risk assessment is carried out to provide 
managers with choices for either protective or compensating actions (ISO 31000, 2009; 
PMI, 2013; Howell, 2014). Political risk assessment has been defined as the process by 
which identified political risks are analysed and evaluated while undertaking international 
business (Al Khattab et al., 2011). Accordingly, managing political risk includes both 
responding to eventuating risks (by contingency plans) and treatment of risks before they 
happen (Mortanges and Allers, 1996; ISO 31000, 2009).Generic risk management 




monitoring, reviewing, and knowledge capture of risks (Edwards and Bowen, 2007; ISO 
31000, 2009; PMI, 2013).  
 
Risk analysis involves understanding the nature, assigning a probability, estimating the 
timing of occurrence of the risk as well as determining the consequences; on the other 
hand, evaluation deals with prioritisation and comparison of the risks to criteria using risk 
levels (ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013). For the present study it means analysing and 
evaluating micro-political risks that impact the international construction project.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Construction projects, owing to their complex nature, are beset with risks which if not 
systematically managed can cause a project to miss set objectives (Frynas and Mellahi, 
2003; Zhao and Duan, 2008; Garrido et al., 2011). Poor project performance may result in 
cost and schedule overruns, poor quality and not realising project scope (Hastak and 
Shaked, 2000; Han et al., 2005; Sharma, 2013). Even though all types of risks are 
important, studies have shown that international projects are most sensitive to political 
risks (Usher, 1965; Kobrin, 1979; Chevalier and Hirsch, 1981; Micallef, 1982; Gao, 1983; 
Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Ekpenyong and Umoren, 2010; Abdul-Rahman et al., 2012). It 
is the view of some researchers that these political risks are not being properly managed 
in international construction (CII, 2003a; Zhang and Wei, 2012) 
 
In the literature, political risk has attracted ever-increasing attention over the last two 
decades, despite a lack of agreement on a universally accepted definition (Prakash and 
Luther, 1986; Friedmann and Kim, 1988; Smith and Gannon, 2008). Most studies in 
political risk are slanted towards foreign direct investment (FDI) in sectors other than 
international construction (Agarwal and Feils, 2007). only a handful of research studies 
have been conducted on political risks and still fewer at market and project level (Hastak 
and Shaked, 2000; Alon and Herbert, 2009; Sharma, 2013). It is the aim of this study to 
examine the degree to which political risks impact on international construction projects, 
how they are managed at project level and on which project phase – Conceptualisation, 
Feasibility, Design and development Execution or Handover –political risk impacts the 
most.  
 
The difficulty in managing political risks starts with the lack of clarity on what to assess 




Prakash and Luther, 1986; Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Ekpenyong and Umoren, 2010; Al 
Khattab et al., 2011). Despite this confusion companies still need to anticipate political 
changes and incorporate this knowledge into their decision-making processes in order to 
help managers achieve project goals (Mortanges and Allers, 1996).  
 
According to Deng et al. (2014) and Hastak and Shaked  (2000), of the work undertaken 
by researchers there are few studies on purely political risks and there are even fewer on 
micro-political risks. A study by Deng et al. (2014), used Chinese companies with 
international construction experience and academics to determine variables that make an 
international construction project system susceptible to political risks. Their research 
established six factors, each made up of various variables; these factors are: attribute 
based exposure, core competitive capacity, strategy based exposure, transaction based 
exposure, relative bargain capacity and integrative adaptive capacity. The exposure 
factors opened the project to political risk and had a higher influence than the capacity 
factors. Another study by Zhang and Wei (2012) on Chinese companies operating in the 
construction industry in Libya found that these companies were not good at political risk 
management. Of the twelve political risks identified in Libya in 2010, government stability 
was the most critical followed by internal conflict. 
 
Zwikael and Ahn (2011) after carrying out multi-industry studies involving 701 project 
managers and their supervisors in Israel, New Zealand and Japan concluded that risk 
management, even in its crudest form, has a positive impact on project profit and other 
project goals. That finding was collaborated in other studies on construction and IT 
projects (de Bakker et al., 2010, 2012). Therefore, for international construction projects to 
achieve the set objectives of profit, schedule, quality, scope and client satisfaction, project 
managers must, among other things, correctly assess the micro-political risks and manage 
them proactively. With systematic risk management consisting of many steps (ISO 31000, 
2009; PMI, 2013), the procedural deficiencies that lead to poor performance of projects are 
not known. It maybe that the failures lie within the assessment of risks or subsequent 
management of risk; empirical research can possibly provide some insights into the 
procedural deficiencies.  
 
Studies in the risk management process in international construction are necessary to 
provide empirical evidence on the matter. With micro-political risks arising from host 
government and host society, for projects in one country the risks are likely to be 




a country-based study on micro-political risks could add to the overall knowledge on risk 
management in international construction. As Namibia is implementing a multi-billion 
Namibian dollar infrastructural investment drive as espoused in the 4th National 
Development Plan (NDP4) which is forming part of Vision 2030 (NPC, 2012) it is expected 
that a growing number of projects will be undertaken and that some of these will be in the 
international construction sector making Namibia a good candidate for such a study. In 
addition, the project specific political risks that impact on international construction projects 
in Namibia and how these are managed is not known. Therefore, this study aims to identify 
the key micro-political risks, establish the methods of assessment, examine how they are 
managed and determine the phase of the project life  cycle (PLC) which is most affected 
by these risks in international construction projects in Namibia. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The problem to be examined in this study may be stated as: 
 
An international construction project is exposed to micro-political risks, which if not 
systematically assessed and managed, will affect project performance in the areas of cost, 
schedule, quality and scope. However, the specific political risks that impact on 
international construction projects and how these are managed in the context of Namibia 
are not known. Knowledge of these risks and how they are managed will clarify what risks 
are influencing projects in Namibia, whether these risks are being properly managed and 
how to appropriately plan for their occurrence. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The research questions to be addressed are stated as: 
a. What are the key micro-political risks affecting international construction 
projects in Namibia? 
b. Which project phase is most affected by these micro-political risks? 
c. What political risk assessment methods are used by international contractors in 
assessing the effect of micro-political risks on construction projects in Namibia? 
d. How are micro-political risks managed to limit their effect on international 







1.5 RESEARCH AIM 
 
The intended aim of this research is to examine the micro-political risks impacting 
international construction projects in Namibia and whether they are effectively managed 
with a view of improving the performance (profitability) of international construction 
projects. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH PROPOSITION 
 
The research proposition to be tested in this study states that micro-political risk factors 
impact on the performance of international construction projects in Namibia. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Research objectives to be achieved are to: 
a. identify the key project specific micro-political risks affecting international 
construction in Namibia. 
b. determine which phase of the project is most prone to political risk. 
c. establish the political risk assessment methods used on international 
construction projects in Namibia. 
d. identify the strategies used in managing political risks on international 
construction projects in Namibia. 
 
1.8 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
A case research strategy was employed and mostly qualitative data were gathered 
through semi-structured and structured interviews, by participant observation and from 
documents. 
 
1.9 SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
 
As Namibia is implementing a multi-billion dollar infrastructural investment drive as 
espoused in the 4th National Development Plan of Vision 2030 a growing number of 
projects will be undertaken and some of these will be of an international construction 
nature (NPC, 2012). Already several international projects are underway around the 
country. It is envisaged that research into micro-political risks in international construction 




1.10 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
Major limitations of the study are as follows: 
a. Since micro-political risks are specific to a project it may make generalisability 
of findings difficult (Robock, 1971; Alon and Herbert, 2009). 
b. A single case study research method with no proper protocol may fail to meet 
generalisability requirements (Rowley, 2002; Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
c. The use of untested scales in a study impacts negatively on construct validity 
(Rowley, 2002; Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
 
1.11 STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: 
Chapter 1 
Included in this chapter are the introduction and background to the study as well as the 
problem statement, research questions, aim and objectives of the study, proposition to be 
tested, scope of study and limitations of the study. 
Chapter 2 
An extensive and detailed literature review is presented in this chapter. The review covers 
generic risk concepts, construction risk, international construction risk, political risk and 
political risk in international construction. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology being the theoretical concepts of scientific 
research and research design which refers to the steps of gathering data used by the 
researcher to answer the research question. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter deals with data presentation, analysis of data, and interpretation and 
discussion of findings. 
Chapter 5 









In Chapter 1, a motivation was provided for an investigation into the micro-political risks 
affecting project performance of international construction projects in Namibia, and how 
these risks are managed. Consequently, study objectives were set to include the 
investigation of key micro-political risks, assessment techniques, the implementation of 
these assessment techniques and the management of micro-political risks. The review 
sets the broad context of the study, creates and justifies boundaries encompassing the 
extent of the work of  the study, places the study within a scholarly and historical context, 
and  includes a critique of concepts and definitions in order to  synthesise and integrate 
this secondary data (Boote and Beile, 2005; Randolph, 2009). The chapter begins with a 
section on project risk overview, in which the concepts of uncertainty and risk are 
discussed; this is followed by sections on risk in international construction, an overview of 
political risk, systematic risk management, and the last section deals with a conceptual 
framework for the research. 
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RISK 
 
Risk is a social construct and as such, different people may conceptualize and deal with 
risks in different ways (Lefley, 1997; Rosa, 1998; Edwards et al., 2005; Loosemore, 2009; 
Solberg and Njå, 2012). Risks are multi-dimensional, possess social  and psychological  
attributes and are shaped by cultural beliefs and political systems risks (Rosa, 1998; 
Edwards et al., 2005; Assmuth et al., 2010; Solberg and Njå, 2012). Further, research in 
psychology shows that people respond to risk based not only on what they think, but also 
on how they feel (Slovic et al., 2004). Against this backdrop, Renn, (1998) insists that it is 
inadequate to reduce risk to the product of probabilities and consequences, but concedes 
that risk management training counters  the effects of risk perception as it uses integration 
of the scientific assessments of risk into an individual’s risk handling belief system thereby 
improving how these assessments are viewed and how risk actions are taken.  
 
Project risk is defined in various ways. Many definitions are framed negatively, based on 
the downward effects of the risk events (Lefley, 1997; Renn, 1998; Raz et al., 2002; 
Edwards and Bowen, 2007; Baccarini et al., 2008). For example, Baccarini et al., (2008) 
define risk as the probability of an event occurring that will negatively affect the objectives 




however, risk is also defined as a neutral phenomenon with the potential for both positive 
and negative effects (Renn, 1998; Hillson, 2002, 2012a; Cooper et al., 2005; Schieg, 2006; 
Agarwal and Feils, 2007; Baccarini et al., 2008; ISO 31000, 2009; Garrido et al., 2011; 
Jaskowski and Biruk, 2011; PMI, 2013). For example, PMI (2013) defines project risk as 
an uncertain event or condition, which when it occurs, affects project objectives either 
positively or negatively; this definition is closely related to the one given by ISO 31000, 
(2009). The project objectives of time, budget, quality, scope, safety and customer 
satisfaction are affected by risk (ISO 31000, 2009; Morris and Geraldi, 2011; PMI, 2013). 
Added to these project objectives are some organisational ones, such as reputation, 
market entry, market share, rate of return and competitive advantage (Jaafari, 2001; 
Thamhain, 2013).  
 
Defining project risk negatively, limits risk management to risk events and conditions that 
cause harm only, neglecting opportunity risk that enhances project performance; as such 
this study adopts the neutral definition of PMI, (2013). The phenomenon of uncertainty 
associated with risk is reviewed in the following sub-section. 
 
2.2.1 Types of Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty is present in all projects, casting doubt on when and whether project objectives 
can be met (Copeland and Weiner, 1990; Dawson and Dawson, 1995, 1998; Cano and 
Pilar de la Cruz, 2002; Meyer et al., 2002; Ward and Chapman, 2003, 2008; Pollack-
Johnson and Liberatore, 2005; Herroelen and Leus, 2005; Perminova et al., 2008; Brady 
et al., 2012; Sanderson, 2012; Maravas and Pantouvakis, 2012; Jeang, 2014). As aptly 
stated by Lefley, (1997), the only certainty in business is the uncertainty of the future. 
Uncertainty is regarded as lack of sureness regarding possible states and multiple 
outcomes (Miller, 1992; Thiry, 2002; Li et al., 2013). For example, on construction projects 
there is considerable uncertainty and ambiguity during the preconstruction stage, where 
the time-design-cost equation is constantly changing (Abdou, 1996; Ward and Chapman, 
2003). Sources of uncertainty are varied and include assumptions, constraints, future 
possible events, variability, ambiguity and blindspots (Mosaic, 2010a; Li et al., 2013; PMI, 
2013; SA/SNZ, 2013; Hillson, 2014a, 2015). Some of the sources of uncertainty are 
appraised below. 
 
2.2.1.1 Stochastic Uncertainty: Risks can arise from a future event also known as 
stochastic uncertainty, which may or may not occur, but if it does it would affect one or 
more project objectives (Weaver, 2007; Li et al., 2013; Hillson, 2014a, 2015). Risks in this 
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category should be managed through the standard risk management process (ISO 31000, 
2009; PMI, 2013; Hillson, 2015). It is the only risk with a probability of occurrence of less 
than 100%; the other types of uncertainty discussed below, all have a probability of 
occurrence of a 100%  (Mosaic, 2010a; Hillson, 2014a).  
2.2.1.2 Aleatoric Uncertainty: The other name of this uncertainty is ‘variability’ and 
results from certain events with some aspect of the planned task being uncertain (Meyer et 
al., 2002; Mosaic, 2010a; Li et al., 2013; Hillson, 2014a, 2015).  For example, on 
construction projects, the duration, cost, defects rate, resource usage, and productivity 
rates are all uncertain and may be more or less than the estimates. This type of risk 
requires quantitative risk analysis and descriptions relating to ranges and probability 
distributions using tools such as the Monte Carlo simulation, the Bayesian method, or the 
Dempster-Shafer theory (Hillson, 2012b, 2015; Li et al., 2013) 
2.2.1.3 Epistemic Uncertainty: Risks arising from epistemic uncertainty are related to 
definite future events with ambiguous characteristics because the knowledge needed to 
understand this type of uncertainty is not yet available  (Mosaic, 2010a; de Vries et al., 
2011; Li et al., 2013; Hillson, 2014a). For example, that new regulations in a country are 
not fully understood is a fact but to what extent this might affect objectives of a project  is 
uncertain; this uncertainty requires to be managed through exploring, experimentation or 
scenario testing, prototyping, benchmarking and getting expert opinion (Hillson, 2015).   
2.2.1.4 Ontological Uncertainty: The fourth type of risk results from blindspots and is 
variously known as unseen uncertainty, emerging risks, and ‘black swans’. These risks are 
not understood because they are outside the human range of experience or worldview 
(Meyer et al., 2002; Weaver, 2007; de Vries et al., 2011; Hillson, 2015). Although the risks 
cannot be described, they do exist; what is however uncertain, are the consequences 
(which are usually severe) (Mosaic, 2010a; Hillson, 2014a). Risks in this cluster are 
managed by having a resilient project system, flexibility, disaster recovery procedure and 
environmental scanning (Hillson, 2015). 
2.2.2 Risk Concepts 
A proper description of a particular risk should be able to assist with decisions on risk 
response by identifying the source(s), the consequences which could result and the effects 
of such consequences on objectives of a project (Mosaic, 2010b; SA/SNZ, 2013; Piney, 
2014).  
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2.2.2.1 Risk Source: A tangible or intangible element that on its own or in combination 
has potential to give rise to a risk (ISO 31000, 2009). It therefore means a risk source is 
only in a context and does not apply globally (SA/SNZ, 2013). 
2.2.2.2 Risk Event: Refers to a single or more occurrence(s), or non-occurrence(s) of a 
particular set of circumstances and may arise from many causes (ISO 31000, 2009). An 
event may be termed an incident, or an accident , and those events without consequences 
are referred to as ‘near misses’ or ‘near hits’ or ‘close calls’ (ISO 31000, 2009). 
2.2.2.3 Risk Consequence: ISO 31000, (2009) describes it as an outcome of a risk event 
that affects project objectives. Consequences can be expressed qualitatively or 
quantitatively, can be certain or uncertain, with positive or negative effects on objectives. 
2.2.2.4 Likelihood:  This refers to the chance of something happening and can be 
determined subjectively or objectively, qualitatively or quantitatively, and described using 
probability, or a frequency over a time span (ISO 31000, 2009). 
2.3 RISK IN INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
Construction projects have become complex, making them susceptible to risk; factors 
contributing to this complexity are a large number of stakeholders,  new technology, 
inadequate budgets, compressed schedules, and changing requirements (Akintoye and 
Macleod, 1997; Pollack-Johnson and Liberatore, 2005; Ward and Chapman, 2008; 
Zwikael and Ahn, 2011). The literature reveals that  research related to international 
construction has concentrated on the following aspects of risk: general  risk classification, 
identification, analysis, evaluation, mitigation, assessment models, risk based go/no-go 
bidding, and the attitudes of contractors toward risk in the section of international 
construction projects  (Zhi, 1995; Bing and Tiong, 1999; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Han 
and Diekmann, 2001; CII, 2003b; Han et al., 2005, 2007, 2008; Ling and Hoi, 2006; Jha 
and Devaya, 2008; Bu-qammaz et al., 2009; Eybpoosh et al., 2011; Abdul-Rahman et al., 
2012; Loo et al., 2013; Yildiz et al., 2014). 
Zhi (1995) identified 21 risk elements in international construction in China; of these 
elements, six were political risks, featuring in the first ten. These political risks were, high 
inflation, bureaucracy, social security, corruption, tax rate change, foreign exchange 




managerial ability and the political risks attached to the country where construction was 
taking place, as being among the key risks influencing cost overruns. Similarly, Jha and 
Devaya, (2008) identified 14 key risk groups including lack of project management skills, 
and poor government  responsiveness with the latter comprising of political risks: 
government instability, delay in approvals; inconsistent approach towards tax laws, 
environmental laws, expatriate laws, finance laws and corruption levels. The criticism of 
Jha and Devaya, (2008) is that, while it is recognised that the purpose of prioritisation is to 
enable a focus on risks whose effects have most impact, having only 14 key risk groups 
for an international construction project where uncertainty is widespread,  appears to be 
insufficient  and could make the application of  response strategies difficult.   
 
In another study where the  respondents included   international investors, developers, and 
contractors in international construction projects, Wang et al. (2004) identified and 
prioritised 28 risk factors, with political risks amongst  the top in the rankings. In a study of 
factors causing losses on international construction projects, Han et al. (2007) ranked 64 
risks and established that managerial ability was the biggest risk, and that political risks 
were in the top five. In addition political risks emerged as key in international construction 
when, in a study identifying 28 key risks, five political risks were in the top six (Bu-qammaz 
et al., 2009). In one of the few purely political risk studies in international construction 
undertaken in Libya, in which Chinese international construction contractors were 
respondents, Zhang and Wei, (2012) identified 12 major political risks, these being in order 
of priority: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal 
conflict, corruption, the military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. It is pertinent to note that 
these political risks were identified after the 2010 Libyan revolution and that could have 
influenced the rankings. 
 
2.3.1 International Construction Risk Categorization  
 
Risk classification is an important task undertaken before risk assessment because it 
allows risks that may be susceptible to a similar risk management approach, to be grouped  
together, making  them easier to process (Zhi, 1995; Edwards and Bowen, 1998; Tah and 
Carr, 2001; Hillson, 2003; Sharma, 2013). According to Hillson (2003), categorisation 
using a risk breakdown structure (RBS) helps in identifying recurring themes, 




management process. Despite the importance of risk classification, there is not one 
universally agreed method of effecting such a classification (Bing and Tiong, 1999; Hastak 
and Shaked, 2000; Edwards et al., 2005; Al Khattab et al., 2007). As a result, international 
construction risks have been grouped according to different criteria and are presented in 
different formats such as lists, tables, or RBSs (Zhi, 1995; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Han 
and Diekmann, 2001; Shen et al., 2001; Bu-qammaz et al., 2009).  
 
Despite the lack of agreement, risks are mainly categorized based on four dimensions of 
the project:  phase/element, event source, impact and relationship to the project (internal 
or external) (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997; Edwards and Bowen, 1998; Zou et al., 2008; 
Zavadskas et al., 2010). It would appear that most classifications are based on event 
source or risk source (Simon, 1984; Zhi, 1995; Edwards and Bowen, 1998; Hastak and 
Shaked, 2000; Han and Diekmann, 2001; Shen et al., 2001; Hillson, 2003; Bing et al., 
2005; Bu-qammaz et al., 2009). The event source taxonomy is popular because it allows a 
generic approach applicable to all types of projects and facilitates collection of information 
outside the performing organisation (Edwards and Bowen, 1998; Hillson, 2003).  
               
                 Figure 1: RBS for international construction project risk (ICPR) ( Bu-qammaz et al., 2009) 
  
Examples of event source categorisations are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Comparatively 
few classifications are based on the project phase (Ward and Chapman, 1995; Zou et al., 
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2008), or risk impact (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997; Han et al., 2007), or relationship to 
the project (Zavadskas et al., 2010; Barlish et al., 2013; Sharma, 2013), or a combination 
of these (Simon, 1982; Walewski, 2005). A typical example of a mixed classification, 
based on both event source and project phases, is the international project risk 
assessment (IPRA) structure depicted in Table 1. 
The international project risk assessment  structure (Table 1) is part of  a much larger tool 
sponsored by the Construction Industry Institute (CII) (CII, 2003a,b; Walewski, 2005; Yeon 
et al., 2015). The tool was developed specifically for use on international construction 
projects and it conforms to many RM guides including those of the PMI (2013) and ISO 
31000, (2009).  As part of the package, baseline risk relative impact values have been 
established,  facilitating quick use of the tool and closing a knowledge gap (CII, 2003a,b; 
Walewski, 2005). The structure is made up of three tiers: section, category and element; 
with each tier explained  in data sheets supplied with the tool (Walewski, 2005). One 
apparent shortcoming of the classification is the omission of the use of political risk 
variables as found in the literature on political risk; this is evident from the terminology 
used in the classification. The relative impact values in the IPRA tool are used for micro-
political risk analysis in this study. 
Political risk is a major component of international construction risk and features 
prominently in risk taxonomies (Bu-qammaz et al., 2009; Han and Diekmann, 2001; 
Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Shen et al., 2001).Therefore, to succeed, a contractor in 
international construction has to apply systematic political risk management (Kobrin, 1979; 
Kobrin et al., 1980; Simon, 1982, 1984; Torre and Neckar, 1986; Hastak and Shaked, 
2000; Agarwal and Feils, 2007; Al Khattab et al., 2007, 2011; Han et al., 2007; Alon and 
Herbert, 2009).To gain more insight into the construct of political risk, political risk is 
reviewed in the subsection which follows.  
2.4 POLITICAL RISK OVERVIEW 
Research into country risk or political risk started in the 1950s and became popular with 
researchers in the following two decades, motivated  by high profile expropriations and 




         Table 1: IPRA structure (CII, 2003b) 
 
SECTION I – COMMERCIAL 
I.A. Business Plan 
I.A1. Business case 
I.A2. Economic model/feasibility  
I.A3. Economic incentives/barriers 
I.A4. Market/product  
I.A5. Standards and practices  
I.A6. Operations 
I.A7. Tax and tariff 
 
I.B. Finance/funding 
I.B1. Sources & form of funding  
I.B2. Currency 
I.B3. Estimate uncertainty 
I.B4. Insurance 
 
SECTION II – COUNTRY 
 II.A. Tax/tariff 
II.A1. Tariffs/duties  
II.A2. Value added tax 
II.A3. Legal entity establishment  
II.A4. Application of tax laws and potential 
changes  
II.A5. Technology tax  
II.A6. Personal income tax 
II.A7. Corporate income tax  
II.A8. Miscellaneous taxes 
 
II.B. Political 
II.B1. Expropriation and nationalism  
II.B2. Political stability  
II.B3. Social unrest/violence  
II.B4. Repudiation 
II.B5. Government participation and control 
II.B6. Relationship with government/owner 
II.B7. Intellectual property 
 
II.C. Culture 
II.C1. Traditions and business practices 
II.C2. Public opinion 
II.C3. Religious differences 
 
II.D. Legal 
II.D1. Legal basis  
II.D2. Legal standing 
II.D3. Governing law/contract formalities and 
language 
II.D4. Contract type and procedures  
II.D5. Environmental permitting 
II.D6. Corrupt business practices 
 
SECTION III – FACILITIES 
III.A. Project scope  
III.A1. Scope development process  
III.A2. Technology 
III.A3. Hazardous material requirements 
III.A4. Environmental, health, and safety 
III.A5. Utilities and basic infrastructure  
III.A6. Site selection and clear title  
III.A7. Approvals, permits, and licensing 
 
 
III.B. Sourcing and supply 
III.B1. Engineered equipment/ material/tools 
III.B2. Bulk materials  
III.B3. Subcontractors  




III.C1. Design/engineering process 
III.C2. Liability 




III.D1. Workforce availability and skill  
III.D2. Workforce logistics and support 
III.D3. Climate 
III.D4. Construction delivery method 
III.D5. Construction permitting  
III.D6. General contractor availability  
III.D7. Contractor payment  
III.D8. Schedule  
III.D9. Insurance 
III.D10. Safety during construction 
III.D11. Communication and data transfer 
III.D12. Quality 
 
III.E. Start -up 
III.E1. Trained workforce  
III.E2. Facility turnover  
III.E 3. Feedstock and utilities reliability 
 
SECTION IV – PRODUCTION/OPERATIONS  
 IV.A. People 
IV.A1. Operational safety 
IV.A2. Security  
IV.A3. Language 
IV.A4. Hiring/training/retaining  
IV.A5. Localizing operational workforce 
 
IV.B. Legal  
IV.B1. Governing law/operational liability 
IV.B2. Permitting  
IV.B3. Insurance  
IV.B4. Expatriates 
IV.B5. Environmental compliance 
IV.C. Technical 
IV.C1. Logistics and warehousing 
IV.C2. Facilities management and 
maintenance 
IV.C3. Infrastructure support  
IV.C4. Technical support 
IV.C5. Quality assurance and control  




Texaco and Chevron petroleum assets held in Nigeria in 1975, and then in the late 1970s;  
in Nicaragua, El Salvador and then in particular the Iranian revolution with the potential 
loss of US$ 1 billion in assets for multi-national enterprises (Micallef, 1982; Simon, 1984; 
Prakash and Luther, 1986; Agarwal and Feils, 2007; Jarvis and Griffiths, 2007; Yackee, 




of the link between political and societal processes and the business environment (Torre 
and Neckar, 1986). 
 
As Jarvis and Griffiths, (2007) point out, interest in political risk comes in waves but is 
mostly underpinned by the flow of capital from the developed to the developing world. In 
particular, the sovereign debt defaults of the 1980s affected the developing world and that 
was followed, in the 1990s, by the hedge fund problems that resulted in currency 
fluctuations and the Asian financial crisis. The most recent wave was triggered by terrorist 
attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 and the resultant war on terror, retaliatory 
attacks in many jurisdictions and that has imposed political risks on multi-national 
enterprises from mostly from the developed world (Jarvis and Griffiths, 2007). So, even 
though the direct expropriation risk has dwindled because of the World Trade Organisation 
protocols and the observance of international law, trigger events and political risks on 
multi-national enterprises continue to exist, especially with the rapid worldwide 
development of communications and social media (Davis, 1981; Shahid and Hood, 2004; 
Agarwal and Feils, 2007; Jarvis and Griffiths, 2007; Yackee, 2014). 
 
Business practitioners and researchers are yet to agree on a standard definition of political 
risk, as study after study, offers different and sometimes conflicting perspective (Kobrin et 
al., 1980; Fitzpatrick, 1983; Prakash and Luther, 1986; Friedmann and Kim, 1988; Agarwal 
and Feils, 2007; Jarvis and Griffiths, 2007; Smith and Gannon, 2008; Ekpenyong and 
Umoren, 2010). Perhaps a possible reason is that  there has been stagnation in the 
development of a political risk theory since the time of the pioneers in this field of study 
(Jarvis and Griffiths, 2007; Alon and Herbert, 2009; Yackee, 2014).  
 
Most of the definitions of political risk only refer to threat risks (Gao, 1983; Ekpenyong and 
Umoren, 2010; Al Khattab et al., 2007; Rice and Mahmoud, 1986; Kobrin, 1979; Simon, 
1982; Shou et al., 1999; Shahid and Hood, 2004; Torre and Neckar, 1986). An example is  
Simon (1982), who defines political risks as governmental or societal actions or policies 
emanating from within or without the country which may result in reduced performance of 
either a select industry, or several industries. Such definitions ignore opportunities that 
arise from political processes and events. As correctly argued by Alon and Herbert (2009) 
political risk is a neutral phenomenon with scope for the likelihood of both negative and 




risk as events or conditions that emanate from political activities and cause positive or 
negative impacts on project objectives.  
 
There are also other perspectives on  political risk, with Alon and Herbert (2009) identifying 
two broad ways of defining  political risk. The first being that in the past political risk was 
viewed as emanating from an adversarial attitude of the host government  interfering with 
the business of the multi-national enterprise (Shou et al., 1999; Gao, 1983). The second, 
and new approach, considers the construct of political risk as being broad and influenced 
by a variety of environmental factors and thus it does not only arise from the actions of 
government, but also from the actions of society, as well as the actions of other countries 
(Kobrin, 1979; Simon, 1982; Fitzpatrick, 1983; Gao, 1983; Rice and Mahmoud, 1986; Al 
Khattab et al., 2007; Alon and Herbert, 2009; Ekpenyong and Umoren, 2010; Ling and 
Hoang, 2010; Crăciun, 2011; Howell, 2014). In line with the definition of political risk  
adopted for this study, the definition of political risk according to  Ling and Hoang (2010) 
which embraces both downside and upside consequences of risk is considered 
appropriate.  
 
Robock (1971) divides political risks into macro and micro risks, where macro-political 
risks affect the whole country or region, and micro-political risks affect selected industries, 
firms or projects. For example, revolutions, civil wars, nationwide strikes, protests, riots, 
and mass expropriations are macro political risks.  Political risks are classified as external 
risk factors because they are driven by activities outside the company or project (Loo et 
al., 2013; Sharma, 2013). Targeted expropriations, discriminatory taxes, and import 
restrictions applied to specific firms, are micro-political risks (Hastak and Shaked, 2000; 
Han and Diekmann, 2001; Wang et al., 2004; Pheng et al., 2009; Ling and Hoang, 2010; 
Sharma, 2013).  
 
The distinction between political risks at macro level and micro level is important for actual 
political risk will vary, depending on project-level characteristics (Kobrin, 1979; Alon and 
Herbert, 2009; Yackee, 2014). Yackee (2014) illustrates the distinction with the following 
example regarding a decision to invest in a nuclear station in the United States of America 
(USA): even though the USA is regarded  as a country of low level political  risk (Political 
Risk Services, 2015), the chances of being denied a permit for such project are pretty high 
and by stating that the USA is characterised by low political risks does not reveal that it is 





Macro-political risk can be indirect and spasmodic, occurring in times of turmoil when 
foreign companies become tempting and attractive targets for political expedience 
resulting in possible harassment or damage although the objective is to inflict 
embarrassment on sitting governments (Robock, 1971). These risks can also be direct and 
permanent, as in the case of wholesale nationalisation of both foreign and domestic 
industries in Cuba in 1959–60, and Iran in 1979 following revolutions in those countries 
(Robock, 1971; Simon, 1982;  Mascarenhas and Atherton, 1983). Macro risk situations 
can arise from trade boycotts similar to the one imposed by Arab countries on all 
companies with branches in, or trading in any form with, Israel since 1955 (Robock, 1971). 
A similar fate befell foreign companies that were established or trading  in South Africa 
during the apartheid era (Simon, 1984). Another such case was the boycott in 1970 by 
mainland China, of all Japanese companies doing business with Taiwan: in retaliation 
Taiwan presented its own list of boycotted companies doing business with mainland China 
(Robock, 1971).  
 
On the other hand, micro-political risks are more frequent and are targeted at a particular 
industry, firm or project, leading to sudden changes in the business environment (Robock, 
1971; Alon and Herbert, 2009). Industries that are usually targeted for confiscatory or 
discriminatory action, are the ones dominated by foreign ownership, or those that are 
considered to be of strategic importance to the government, such as international 
infrastructure projects: highways, a power plant, or an electrical energy distribution 
network (Robock, 1971; Davis, 1981; Crăciun, 2011). Extractive industries, especially 
mining and petroleum, are vulnerable because as sovereign states assert their economic 
independence, economic nationalism is expressed together with demands that natural 
resources should benefit all in the nation and not be exploited for private profit (Robock, 
1971). One example of deliberate corporate-specific discrimination was by the Venezuelan 
Government, which in 1974 nationalised the oil industry.   
 
2.4.1 Political Risk in International Construction 
 
A construction company is exposed to risk in the home country but in cross border projects 
the entity contends with more complex risks (Robock, 1971; Kobrin, 1979; Zhi, 1995; 
Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Al Khattab et al., 2007; Alon and 
Herbert, 2009; Zhang and Wei, 2012; Loo et al., 2013). Political risk is one of the 
prominent risk factors in international construction projects as it causes financial loss, 




Chevalier and Hirsch, 1981; Micallef, 1982; Gao, 1983; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Wang 
et al., 2004; Al Khattab et al., 2007; Han et al., 2007; Jha and Devaya, 2008; Ekpenyong 
and Umoren, 2010; Eybpoosh et al., 2011; Abdul-Rahman et al., 2012). However political 
risk can be managed (Moran, 2003;Hood and Nawaz, 2004; Nawaz and Hood, 2005  cited 
by Al Khattab et al., 2011). Despite such evidence, not much research has been done on 
political risks in international construction (Zhi, 1995; Edwards and Bowen, 1998; Bing and 
Tiong, 1999; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; CII, 2003a,b; Wang et al., 2004; Alon and Herbert, 
2009; Bu-qammaz et al., 2009; Sharma, 2013). The situation is even more worrisome in 
the area of micro-political risk, prompting Alon and Herbert, (2009) to describe research in 
this area as being in its infancy. 
 
According to Alon and Herbert, (2009), one of the possible  reasons why researchers shun 
research in micro-political risk, is the difficulty with generalisability of the results of such 
research. That being the case, one can argue that since projects are unique endeavours 
(PMI, 2013), it would be naïve to consider generalisability of all project risks. Hence 
worthwhile micro-political risk research can still be done, on a country basis, and to a large 
extent, still satisfy generalisability requirements despite the ever changing political 
landscape that influences political risk. It is with this conviction that the researcher 
conducts this study to contribute to successful implementation of international construction 
projects in Namibia.  
 
2.4.2 Political Risk Classification 
 
Al Khattab et al., (2007) used the event–source approach to classify political risks. Three 
sources of threats are identified namely; host government, host society and the possible 
risks, which could result from each of these sources, are shown in Table 2. The framework 
presented by Al Khattab et al. (2007) is limited as sources of political risks are much 
broader that what they assumed (Simon, 1984; Torre and Neckar, 1986). Another 
shortcoming is lack of distinction between macro and micro-political risk (Kobrin, 1979; 
Simon, 1982).  
 
Simon (1982) used a classification based on two dimensions of event source and 
relationship to project, to develop a framework for political risk as shown in Table 3. In this 
framework risks are split into those arising from the actions of governments and those 




the framework by Simon, (1984), leaves out some important sources of political risk, 
exemplified by the press, public opinion and delays in the approval of permits. 
 
            Table 2: Classification of political risk (Al Khattab et al., 2007) 
 
Source of threat Threats (source of harm) 
Host Government • Expropriation and or confiscation 
• Contract repudiation 
• Currency inconvertibility 
• Ownership and or personnel restrictions 
• Taxation restrictions 
• Import or export restrictions 
Host Society • Terrorism 
• Demonstrations, riots and insurrection 
• Revolutions, coups d'état and civil wars 
Interstate • Wars 
• Economic sanctions 
 
Using event source as the basis of categorisation Simon, (1984) developed a broad-based 
and detailed conceptual framework for the multi-national enterprise. The primary 
categorisation is based on the environment in which the multi-national enterprise operates, 
as being the source of political risks. The operating environment of an overseas company 
is created by the host government, the home-country, the international arena and the 
global arena as shown in Figure 2. Table 4 presents the flow of political risk as it is 
generated by the sources, divided into four clusters: Direct-Internal, Direct- External, 
Indirect-Internal, and Indirect-External. 
 
With such a proliferation of sources of political risk that can impact the business 
environment, a foreign company  assessing political risk, should, in addition to analysing 
the power structures in the host country, consider the impact of the actions of the home 
country and developments in the global environment (Simon, 1984; Alon and Herbert, 
2009). This study aims to assess micro-political risks and the application of systematic risk 
management in managing these risks on international construction projects in Namibia and 









Table 3: Framework for political risk (Simon, 1982) 
A General Framework for Political Risk 
 Macro  Micro 




















Radical regime change 
High inflation 





National boycott of firm 
Selective nationalisation/ 
Expropriation, Selective 
indigenisation, Joint venture 
pressure, Discriminatory 
taxes, Local content/hiring 
laws, Industry specific 
regulations, Breach of 
contract, Subsidisation of 







Cross national guerrilla 
warfare 
International terrorism 







High external debt service ration 
International economic instability 
International activist groups 
Foreign MNE competition 
Selective international 
terrorism 
International boycott of firm 
Diplomatic stress between 
host and home country 






Host Country Environment Home Country Environment 
Government actions/policies 
Societal actions/attitudes Local business community 
actions, Legal community rulings ,Media reports 
Government actions/policies 
Societal actions/attitudes Local business community 




International Environment Global Environment 
Foreign policies (economic, military, 
Diplomatic) of nation states 
Regional organisations' actions/policies 
International activist groups' actions/policies 
Internal developments in nation states 
Global organisations' actions/policies (UN, IMF) 
Global developments (worldwide 
inflation, recession, oil crisis, commodity price 
fluctuations, external debt crises) 




Table 4: Flow and type of risk (Simon, 1984) 
Flow of Risk Type of risk 








Nationalization, expropriation, indigenization, import/export regulations, restrictions on remittances, 
environmental standards, local content rules, price and wage controls, licensing regulations, 
requirements for technology transfer, breach of contract, devaluations, inflation, recession 
 







Regional organisations-to- MNE 
 





Taxation policy, restrictions on MNE overseas operations, restrictions on technology transfer, fines 
for illegal payments to host government official 
 
Negative public opinion, pressure for disinvestment, protests, demonstration 
 
Codes on MNE conduct, labour demands in member nations, boycotts 
 
Protests, demonstrations, boycotts, terrorist attacks, pressure for disinvestment 
 
Codes on MNE conduct, labour demands in member nations, boycotts 
iii. INDIRECT-INTERNAL 
Host society-to-host government-to-MNE 
 
 
Host society-to-host society-to-MNE 
 
Host business community-to-host government-to-
MNE 
 






Host media-to-host government-to-MNE 
 
Host government-to-host government-to-M 
 
 
Civil war, revolution, guerrilla war, protests, riots, demonstrations, election of anti-business 
politicians, pressure on government to restrict foreign business  
 
Ethnic/religious conflicts, factional conflicts  
 
 
Discriminatory taxes, subsidization of competition, local content requirements, pressure for joint 
ventures 
 
Anti-foreign business rulings by the courts 
 
 
Promotion of anti-foreign business sentiments, protests, strikes, boycotts 
 
Promotion of tighter government restrictions on foreign business 
 
Leadership struggle, coups, radical regime change, bureaucratic delays, more restrictive policies 
toward 
foreign business 
iv. INDIRECT-EXTERNAL  




Regional organisation-to-host government-to-MNE 
 





Nation-state [internal developments]-to-host society-
to-MNE 
 
Home government-to- nation-state-to-host 
government/society-to- MNE 
 
Home media-to-home society-to-MNE 
 
Home media-to-home government-to-MNE 
 




Regional organisation-to-home government-to-MNE 
 




Deterioration in relations, economic sanctions, reciprocity/retaliation 
 
War, border conflicts, economic sanctions, trade agreements detrimental to MNE  
 
International economic sanctions, negative international public opinion  
 
International economic sanctions, negative international public opinion  
 
 
Spillover of international war to host country, multilateral trade agreements detrimental 
to MNE 
 
Spillover of internal turmoil, spread of anti-foreign 
business sentiment  
 
Anti-foreign business sentiment caused by home country foreign policy in other regions or countries  
 
Promotion of negative public opinion concerning MNE investment in the host country  
 




Home government protection/legal rulings against host government affecting MNE products 
 
Pressure for disinvestment from host country  
 
Pressure for disinvestment from host country  
 
Reduced profits, curtailment of expansion, disinvestment due to global inflation, recession, energy 






2.5 PROJECT POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Project risk management is the structured process of dealing with project risks to produce 
an acceptable balance between threat and opportunities risks (Meyer et al., 2002; Oztas 
and Okmen, 2004; Thevendran, 2004; Cooper et al., 2005; Edwards and Bowen, 2007; 
Hlaing et al., 2008; ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013). To successfully implement RM it should 
be understood organisation-wide or at least project-wide and be assimilated into 
organisational culture (Cooper et al., 2005; Edwards and Bowen, 2007; ISO 31000, 2009; 
PMI, 2013; SA/SNZ, 2013). For international construction projects, proactive risk 
management is even more important  than for home-country projects, because of the more 
complex risks, including political risk which is always part of  international business 
transactions (Robock, 1971; Kobrin, 1979; Kobrin et al., 1980; Fitzpatrick, 1983; 
Friedmann and Kim, 1988; Zhi, 1995; Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Hastak and Shaked, 
2000; CII, 2003a; Al Khattab et al., 2007; Han et al., 2008; Alon and Herbert, 2009; Abdul-
Rahman et al., 2012; Zhang and Wei, 2012; Loo et al., 2013). Moreover, evidence shows 
that project risk management leads to improved project performance for projects (Mills, 
2001; Raz et al., 2002; Han et al., 2008; Zwikael and Ahn, 2011; de Bakker et al., 2012; 
Iqbal et al., 2015). To the contrary, Ward and Chapman,(2003) questioned the 
effectiveness of project risk management in its current form arguing that it should focus 
more on uncertainty to deliver successful projects. 
 
Despite risk management having evolved many decades ago in finance and insurance 
sectors, project risk management gained prominence in the 1980s (Bredillet, 2010; 
Crawford et al., 2006; Arrow, 2008). That late adoption probably explains why researchers 
find that in the construction industry, field personnel either do not apply effective risk 
management to projects or they do not apply it correctly, and as a result, construction 
projects have yet to reap the full benefits of risk management (Fitzpatrick, 1983; Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Akintoye and Macleod, 1997; Lyons and Skitmore, 2004; Ling 
and Hoi, 2006; Dada and Jagboro, 2007; Han et al., 2007; Panthi et al., 2009; Ehsan et al., 
2010; Banaitien et al., 2011; Eybpoosh et al., 2011; Zhang and Wei, 2012; 
AdedokunIbironke et al., 2013; AdedokunOgunsemi et al., 2013). Additionally, Hwang and 
Chen, (2015) claim that a lack of formal management training of the leaders in the 
construction industry, does not help the situation either. 
 
Researchers argue that implementing project risk management which starts at concept 




(see Figure 3), yields maximum  benefits for the project (Raz et al., 2002; CII, 2003b; Ward 
and Chapman, 2003; Walewski, 2005; Han et al., 2007, 2008; Zou and Zhang, 2009; 
Osipova and Eriksson, 2011; Cagliano et al., 2014).  
 
             
Figure 3: IPRA Implementation during the project life cycle (PLC) (CII, 2003b) 
 
The  IPRA tool is an example of the PLC approach with recommended implementation as 
depicted in Figure 3 (CII, 2003a,b; Walewski, 2005). It is advanced that another advantage 
of the  PLC approach is that it avoids the compartmentalization phenomenon, where each 
participant approaches risks with a self interest  perspective, based on their own goals, 
ignoring the interests of other project parties (Ward and Chapman, 1995; CII, 2003b; 
Dikmen et al., 2008; Cagliano et al., 2014).  
 
Advantages of instituting risk management early in the project life cycle are that: 
• it questions the many assumptions that most affect the success of a project;  
• attention is focused on risk control in the early stages to avert risks at minimum 
cost; 
• it enables cost-benefit analysis of effective risk control activities;  
• it optimises the allocation of project resources on major risks to achieve the best 
results by removing unnecessary contingency, and;  
• it facilitates more accurate and realistic cost estimating as risks are itemized and 
quantified (Mills, 2001; CII, 2003a; Ward and Chapman, 2003; Li and Zou, 2008; 





Even though all types of risks are important to manage, studies have shown that 
international projects are very sensitive to political risks (Usher, 1965; Kobrin, 1979; 
Chevalier and Hirsch, 1981; Micallef, 1982; Gao, 1983; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; 
Ekpenyong and Umoren, 2010; Abdul-Rahman et al., 2012). As explained by Ling and 
Hoang, (2010), political uncertainty is a major hurdle for foreign companies in international 
construction because of many factors:  unfamiliar bureaucratic system of a foreign country, 
adaunting approval process for land acquisition, and construction and occupation permits 
which are all under the control of  a local authority or government officials rendering most 
operational decisions dependent on their goodwill. They add that governments may also 
directly influence the construction industry through policies and legislation regarding 
licenses and permits, building codes, minimum wage rates, corporate taxes, discriminatory 
taxation, levies and rules relating to the import of materials and equipment. However as 
observed in preceding sections political risks like any other risks can be managed with 
positive results for an international construction project. To effectively manage micro-
political risks there are methodologies or frameworks that are applied and some of these 
are appraised in the following subsection.  
 
2.5.1 Risk Management Methodologies 
 
There are a number of risk management (RM) frameworks in addition to institutional 
procedural task-based guides for systematic RM (Bu-qammaz et al., 2009). Included in the 
latter  cluster are  PMBOK’s  PRM Section (PMI, 2013), Management of Risk  (M_ o_ R) of 
the Office of Commerce (UK) (Jia et al., 2013),  Project Risk Assessment and 
Management  (PRAM) of the Association of Project Management (Chapman, 1997; APM, 
2000), Risk Analysis and Management for Projects Methodology (RAMP) by the Institution 
of Civil Engineers (Cano and Pilar de la Cruz, 2002), RM-Principles and guidelines by ISO 
31000, (2009), RISKMAN sponsored by the European Community and HM Treasury 
(Tummala and Burchett, 1999; Fidan et al., 2011) and PRINCE2 (OGC, 2002). A 
comparative summary of some of these are shown in Table 5 together with the steps 
involved.  
 
Although these frameworks find widespread use, they are not without their critics whose 
main argument is that these processes are reductionist and do not show the cause and 
effect relationships and resultant networks of sources, risks and effects but instead use the 




Assmuth et al., 2010; Eybpoosh et al., 2011; Fidan et al., 2011). While recognising the 
limitations of the frameworks and guidelines, a choice of an approach for the risk 
management process (RMP) has to be made, and that is covered in the next subsection. 
 











2.5.2 Risk Management Approach 
 
To comply with the guidelines of project management bodies and  ISO 3100, the study 
adopts the approach used by Cooper et al. (2005), which is similar to the one in ISO 
31000 (2009) and is consistent with approaches used by other project management 
bodies. The steps involved are shown in Figure 4 which  are establish context, risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, risk treatment, risk monitoring and review and 
communicate and consult (APM, 2000; OGC, 2002; Cooper et al., 2005; Nicholas and 
Steyn, 2008; Hedeman and Seegers, 2009; ISO 31000, 2009; Banaitien et al., 2011; PMI, 
2013; SA/SNZ, 2013).  
 
Risk assessment refers to the steps of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation 
whereas management of risks involves planning treatment strategies, implementing them 
and monitoring and reviewing if the strategies are working (ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013; 
SA/SNZ, 2013).  According to Cooper et al., (2005), the risk management process (RMP) 





PMI OGC ISO IRM HM 
Treasury 
RM planning        
Risk Identification          
Risk Analysis        
Risk Assessment          
Risk Response          
Risk Monitoring          
Risk Control        





   Figure 4: The risk management process (Cooper et al., 2005) 
   
2.5.3 Risk Management Techniques 
 
The use of a framework or an approach to prioritise micro-political risks is achieved 
through the use of appropriate techniques or methods (Kobrin et al., 1980; Fitzpatrick, 
1983; Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2007; Al Khattab et al., 2011; Cagliano et 
al., 2014). Political risk assessment methods are divided into two broad categories namely, 
qualitative (heuristic), and quantitative (scientific) methods (Fitzpatrick, 1983; Mortanges 
and Allers, 1996; Al Khattab et al., 2011). The qualitative methods are further split into 
qualitative unstructured methods and qualitative structured methods. Evidence  shows that 
in undertaking political risk forecasting, executives use subjective heuristic  techniques 
more often than they use scientific ones (Kobrin et al., 1980; Mortanges et al., 1996; Al 
Khattab et al., 2011). 
 
               Table 6: Questions for the project manager (adapted from Cooper et al., 2005) 
RMP step Management question 
Establish the context 
Identify the risks 
Analyse the risks 
Evaluate the risks 
Treat the risks 
Monitor and review 
Communicate and consult 
What is to be achieved? 
What might happen? 
What might that mean for key criteria of the project? 
What are the most important points? 
What is going to be done about them? 
How will they be kept under control? 
Who should be involved in the process? 
 
Al Khattab et al. (2011) attributed this approach to the flexibility, simplicity, and low-cost 
nature of the so-called heuristic techniques as compared to the scientific ones, which 
require formal training in statistics and modelling.  
30 
The first unstructured heuristic method is the intuition and judgment of managers.  A well-
known approach is the so-called ‘grand tour’ where executives visit the host country for 
meetings and consultations with influential figures in business, unions, government, and 
others. The managers then base their political risk identification and analysis on their 
findings and experience on the trip abroad. Judgment and intuition of management was 
found to be the most preferred method by both Jordanian and Dutch multi-national 
enterprises (Al Khattab et al., 2011). In another study the technique was used by 79% of 
Canadian multi-national enterprises (Rice and Mahmoud 1990, as cited in Al Khattab et 
al., 2011). 
The second qualitative unstructured technique is to make use of ‘expert opinion’, also 
known as the old hand method. This technique relies on valuable multiple sources of 
information such as academics, former political figures, journalists, banks, advisory 
councils of foreign business people, and local government officials. The disadvantage is 
possible imprecise nature of provided data and  bias by these experts (Mortanges and 
Allers, 1996; Al Khattab et al., 2011). Gathering expert opinion was the second most 
commonly used technique by Jordanian and Dutch multi-national enterprises (Mortanges 
and Allers, 1996; Al Khattab et al., 2011). 
The Delphi technique, standardized check lists, and scenarios fall under the qualitative 
structured methods (Mortanges and Allers, 1996). In the Delphi technique, a panel of 
geographically dispersed experts are approached for an opinion on a political-environment 
matter, such as the probability of the occurrence of social unrest in a given country. A 
statistical distribution of responses from the experts is produced, and shown to the 
experts, giving them an opportunity to change or amend their initial opinion. This process 
is repeated several times and in the last round, the average of the opinion of the experts is 
adopted as the answer.  As claimed by Al Khattab et al. (2011), the Delphi technique is an 
invaluable method  for the prediction of future events, in the absence of historical data. 
Standardized checklists are used for both the identification and the analysis of risk. In this 
technique, managers review risk elements on a list and then rank these risks (Mortanges 
and Allers, 1996). Al Khattab et al. (2011) criticise this technique; it has the following 
drawbacks:  it is static and therefore ignores future events, standardisation impairs the 




Dutch multi-national enterprises, Mortanges and Allers (1996) found that it was the third  
most commonly used technique for political risk assessment. 
In the scenario approach, several scenarios are formulated for the target country, with 
probabilities attributed to the possible occurrence of future alternatives. It enables 
managers to take strategic decision about the future and to be prepared for future 
eventualities (Al Khattab et al., 2011). 
 
The scientific methods use software packages and quantitative input data. These data are 
obtained from economic data and national statistics of the host country and typically 
comprises items like defence expenditure, per capita income, and per capita education 
expenditure, as well as annual figures on crime and domestic violence. People with 
specialised skills are required to run these software packages and to sensibly interpret the 
results.  Jarvis and Griffiths, (2007) on evolution of approaches to political risk, claim that 
with advances in computer technology, the current focus is on computer models for 
political risk assessment and management. The advantages of this method are precision 
and less dependence on subjective qualitative data. However, the credibility of 
government data used as input, as well as the time lag of the data which makes it 
historical, puts a damper on this approach (Mortanges and Allers, 1996). 
 
Other ways of risk assessment make use of political risk consultants such as BERI, the 
PRS Group, ICRG, the Eurasia Group, PERC (Hong Kong), and many others (Fitzpatrick, 
1983; Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Howell, 2014). These companies provide an array of 
ratings that investors can use. Also sector-specific models such as the ASPRO-SPAIR 
developed by Shell Oil for the oil industry, are widely used (Mortanges and Allers, 1996). 
 
2.5.4 Context: Risk Management Plan 
 
In accordance with the adopted risk management approach, the first step in the risk 
management process is to establish the context within which the risk management 
process takes place (Oztas and Okmen, 2004; Cooper et al., 2005; Edwards and Bowen, 
2007; ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013; Bharathy and Mcshane, 2014; Hillson, 2014b). This is 
achieved by considering important external and internal factors, which determine the 
extent and structure of the risk management process, and the formulation of the risk 
policy. These factors include identifying the key internal and external stakeholders, and 
determining the external and internal environments (relevant procedures and policies) that 




Edward and Bowen (2007) emphasise the need to isolate and nominate the dominant 
stakeholder whose risks are to be managed, as well as to locate where decisions are 
made  and also whether it is the procurement, operations or disposal phase of the project. 
For this study, the building contractor is considered to be the stakeholder whose risks are 
of concern.  Additionally, the context is set by documenting the risk categories, risk criteria, 
techniques and tools, staffing needs, and the frequency of risk activities (ISO 31000, 2009; 
Bharathy and Mcshane, 2014). 
 
The outcome of establishing the context for the risk management process is a risk 
management plan  whose contents include: methodology and techniques, roles and 
responsibilities, risk budget, timing or frequency of risk management activities, risk 
categories, definitions of risk probability and impact scales, probability-impact matrix for 
risk prioritisation, risk criteria (thresholds and tolerances), reporting formats (documenting 
risk management activities, analysis and communicating about the process) and tracking 
(risk activity recording and risk management process audit process) (OGC, 2002; ISO 
31000, 2009; PMI, 2013). 
 
2.5.5 Stakeholder Identification 
 
Stakeholders are any individuals, groups, or organisations, who may have actual or 
perceived stake, or interest in the performance of a project (Chinyio and Akintoye, 2008; 
Ward and Chapman, 2008; Jepsen and Eskerod, 2009; PMI, 2013). There are internal and 
external stakeholders for every project (Wang and Huang, 2006; Rowlinson and Cheung, 
2008; Ward and Chapman, 2008). Apart from being a big source of uncertainty, 
stakeholders bring different and sometimes conflicting objectives to the project (Ward and 
Chapman, 2008; Tang and Shen, 2013; Davis, 2014). Different stakeholders also have 
unique risk profiles, risk appetites and risk attitudes (Cano and Pilar de la Cruz, 2002; 
Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2011). 
 
One method of stakeholder identification is the soft systems methodology (SSM) which 
uses the CATWOE approach (Stewart and Fortune, 1995; Checkland, 2000; Joham et al., 
2009). CATWOE is an acronym standing for customer, actor, transformation, 











Environmentalists, residents, surrounding communities, 
businesses, media 
A 
Actors– the doers Contractor, suppliers, subcontractors, Consultants 
(architects, civil/ electrical engineers, town planners) 
T 
The transformation 
Process–to do what? 
The construction of roads, water, sewer and electricity 
infrastructure and low cost houses  
W 
Worldview–perspective Providing infrastructure and decent accommodation for 
vulnerable people will raise their living standard 
O 
The owners–the decision 
makers 
Local council, regional government, national government, 
government agency 
E 
The environment–why is 
the project being done? 
Partial fulfilment of national objectives of raising the living 
standards for all citizens. 
 
 
To aid with the identification of stakeholders the rich picture technique usually forms part of 
the analysis (Stewart and Fortune, 1995; Checkland, 2000; Day, 2003; Taylor, 2010). For 
example, the worldview of a public housing project could be to provide infrastructure and 
decent accommodation for vulnerable people, and to raise their standard of living. The 
CATWOE is used in identifying stakeholders for the project (see Table 7). The identified 
stakeholders have interests in and objectives for the project and some of these are 
considered next. 
 
2.5.6 Stakeholder Objectives 
 
Risk management is concerned with managing risk so that project objectives are met 
(Cooper et al., 2005; Edwards and Bowen, 2007; ISO 31000, 2009; Abdul-Rahman et al., 
2012). The objectives may include rate of return, gross profit, net profit, cash flows, time of 
completion, milestones, quality standards, safety, health and environmental requirements 
(Han and Diekmann, 2001; Cooper et al., 2005; Laryea and Hughes, 2011). In 
construction the contract documents spell out the risks for which each party is responsible 
and therefore to a large extent contract documents act as a source of the objectives to be 
achieved in contract delivery (Ibrahim et al., 2006; Hameed and Woo, 2007; Hanna et al., 
2013; Hwang et al., 2013). On a construction project there are many stakeholders who 




risk management system for a particular project; therefore each stakeholder must manage 
their own risks (Edwards and Bowen, 2007). 
 
2.5.7 Risk Identification  
 
Because all subsequent steps in the risk management process are dependent on the 
identified risks, identification of risks is the single most important step in the process 
(Chapman, 1998; Mills, 2001; Hwang et al., 2014; Hwang and Chen, 2015). The purpose 
of risk identification is to define the causes of the risks and the potential impacts of the risk 
events or conditions to which the project is exposed (Edwards et al., 2009; Cagliano et al., 
2014; Hwang and Chen, 2015). Structured creativity and imagination play an important 
role in risk identification since it is a difficult task to execute (Mills, 2001; Lyons and 
Skitmore, 2004; Hwang and Chen, 2015).  
 
According to Simon (1984), risk classification should be detailed but simple to understand 
so that it can easily be applied to international construction projects. However, one of the 
criticisms would be the lack of a direct distinction between macro and micro-political risks. 
Nonetheless, in combination with the framework given in Simon (1982) the taxonomy 
provides an adequate source of micro-political risk variables for use in obtaining empirical 
data on micro-political risks applicable to international projects. The variables in the 
frameworks in Simon (1982, 1984) frameworks in combination with variables in other 
political risk studies that form the basis of the micro-political risk variables used for this 
study (Kobrin et al., 1980; Fitzpatrick, 1983; Torre and Neckar, 1986; Zhi, 1995; Mortanges 
et al., 1996; Bing and Tiong, 1999; Hastak and Shaked, 2000; Han et al., 2007; Ling and 
Hoi, 2006; Al Khattab et al., 2008; Jha and Devaya, 2008; Al Khattab et al., 2011; Bu-
qammaz et al., 2009; Eybpoosh et al., 2011; Abdul-Rahman et al., 2012; Loo et al., 2013).  
 
2.5.8 Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analysis determines the level of risk by assigning a probability to occurrence and  
assessing the  impact of risk on project objectives of cost, schedule, scope and quality 
variance (Mills, 2001; Cooper et al., 2005; ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013; Cagliano et al., 
2014; Hwang and Chen, 2015).  
 
For risk analysis, the IPRA tool, which uses a semi quantitative technique, is used for this 
study (PMI, 2013). As discussed below for quantifying risks, two attributes are normally 
used namely the likelihood or probability of occurrence and effects on objectives measured 




2.5.8.1 The probability of occurrence 
 
The division of probability of occurrence as given in CII (2003b) for the IPRA tool is shown 
in Table 8. The table highlights the descriptors and the Likert scale values from 1 to 5 for 
the various probability segments.  
         Table 8: Division for probability of risk occurrence (adapted from CII, 2003b) 
  
Occurrence Probability 
NA - Not applicable to this project. zero 
1 - Very low chance of occurrence; rare and occurs only in exceptional circumstances. <10% chance 
2 - Low chance and unlikely to occur in most circumstances. 10% <35% 
3 - Moderate chance and possible to occur in most circumstances. 35% <65% 
4 - High chance of happening and will probably occur in most circumstances. 65% <90% 
5 -Very high chance of occurrence and almost certain and expected in most circumstances. 90% or more 
 
2.5.8.2 Relative impact of the risk 
 
Table 9 outlines the rating system for measuring the relative impact of risk. The relative 
impact of a risk is its ranking based on its overall impact on project objectives (CII, 2003b). 
The relative impact rankings are given letter designations ranging from A to E starting with 
A = ‘negligible’ and E= ‘extreme’. 
 
Table 9: Relative impact definitions (CII, 2003b) 
 
RELATIVE IMPACT 
A Negligible consequence that routine procedure would be sufficient to deal with the consequences. 
B Minor consequence that would threaten an element of the project. Normal control and monitoring measures are sufficient 
C 
Moderate consequence would necessitate significant adjustment to the project. Requires identification and control of all 
contributing factors by monitoring conditions and reassessment at project milestones. 
D 
Significant consequence that would threaten goals and objectives; requires close management. Could substantially delay 
the project schedule or significantly affect technical performance or costs, and requires a plan to handle 
E 
Extreme consequence would stop achievement of project or organisational goals and objectives. Most likely to occur and 
prevent achievement of objectives, causing unacceptable cost overruns, schedule slippage, or project failure 
    
2.5.8.3 The relative importance of risk 
 
Using the international project risk assessment tool, the relative importance of a risk on a 
project is determined by combining the relative impact and probability/likelihood of the risk 
element. Using the IPRA risk assessment sheet (see Appendix G), the rating for likelihood 
of occurrence  (L), and the rating for relative impact (I), give the coordinates (L, I) of the 
element, yielding a  risk classification of 'low', 'moderate', 'severe', or 'extreme', thereby 
indicating the relative importance of the risk. The coordinates  are plotted on the probability 
36 
impact matrix shown in Figure 5; in this case an adapted double Probability/Impact matrix 
to address both threats and opportunity risks (Hillson, 2002; PMI, 2013). All identified risk 
elements are similarly plotted on the matrix. The red zone shows extreme risks, the orange 
zone indicates severe risks, the yellow zone contains moderate risks, and low-ranked risks 
are in the green zone.  
The baseline or benchmark relative impact values are used where there is lack of 
knowledge or where one is unsure of the potential impacts thus closing a knowledge gap 



















































































Low risk Negligible 












Low risk Negligible 
A B C D E E D C B A 
Impact (on project objectives  e.g. cost, time, scope or quality)
Notes 
Extreme risk (E) – occurrence would prevent achievement of objectives, causing unacceptable cost overruns, schedule slippage, or 
project failure 
Severe risk (S) – could substantially delay the project schedule or significantly affect technical performance or costs, and requires a plan 
to handle 
Moderate risk (M) – requires identification and control of all contributing factors by monitoring conditions and reassessment at project 
milestones. 
Low risk (L) – normal control and monitoring measures are sufficient. 
Negligible Risk (N)- Controls adequate, risk level reduced to as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) 
Not Applicable (NA) – this element does not apply to this participant or this project. 
Figure 5: Double probability- impact matrix (adapted from Walewski, 2005) 
2.5.9 Risk Evaluation 
Risk evaluation involves comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria or 
thresholds that were predetermined to establish whether the risk and/or its magnitude is 
within acceptable criteria or tolerances (Cooper et al., 2005; ISO 31000, 2009; Hillson and 
Murray-Webster, 2011; PMI, 2013). Table 10 is an illustrative example of an evaluation 















at this level 
Extreme 
Not permitted unless approved by 
the Board. Reduce the level of risk to 
high or below 
Immediate-stop until treated. For 
complex treatments, implement short-
term controls with permanent 
treatments completed within 1 month. 
Avoid Board 
Severe 
Only acceptable if it is not 
practicable or efficient to reduce the 
level of risk. Otherwise reduce the 
level of risk to Moderate or below. 
As soon as possible, but complete 






Moderate Acceptable for a limited period of 
time to allow treatment to be in 
keeping with the business or project 
plan priorities 






Low Plan to treat in keeping with all other priorities. 
Ongoing control as part of 
general or routine management 
activities 
Reduce retain Managers 
Negligible No further treatment required Existing controls are sufficient Retain (ALARP) Supervisors 
 
 
2.5.10 Risk Response Planning 
 
Political risk assessment is carried out to provide managers with choices for either 
protective or compensating actions that enhance opportunities and reduce threats (PMI, 
2013; Howell, 2014). Once the relative importance of a risk element has been determined 
a risk plan is developed to minimise threats and maximize opportunities (ISO 31000, 2009; 
PMI, 2013; Cagliano et al., 2014). Threats rated high require immediate response and 
aggressive actions and those ranked ‘low’ are only required to be logged in the risk 
register for monitoring. Similarly, for opportunity risks in the red zone, and are realisable 
with least effort require immediate attention, while those opportunity risks in the green 
zone need only to be  logged and monitored (PMI, 2013). 
 
For construction projects, researchers have long argued that the most efficient response to 
risks is to allocate risks, to the party with the expertise and ability to effectively deal with 
those risks (Mills, 2001; Medda, 2007; Chapman and Ward, 2008; Chan et al., 2011). The 
tendency, according to recent research, is that the owner, through contract documents 
wants to transfer most of the risks to the main contractor (Zhi, 1995; Mills, 2001; Khazaeni 
et al., 2012). As Hanna et al. (2013) explain the contractor in turn either allows a 
contingency to mitigate for those risks and/or transfers those risks to the subcontractor 
who has the least amount of control over on decisions that generate or mitigate these 
risks, and subcontractors then often end up carrying the majority of the construction risks.  
 
Every risk control action must offer value for money in relationship to the risk being treated 




available risk response strategies for threats are transfer, share, reduce (mitigation), avoid, 
and retain (accept), depending on the relative importance or priority of the risk (Akintoye 
and Macleod, 1997; Mills, 2001; Han et al., 2008; Cagliano et al., 2014). Zhi (1995) on the 
other hand proposes three broad channels of risk response: by contract (transfer/share), 
by insurance (transfer/share), and by retention management (mitigate/accept). According 
to ISO 31000:2009  the responses to opportunity risk are exploit, enhance, share and 
accept. Again Zhi (1995) in his analysis acknowledges that most political risks are within 
the retention management channel. For efficacy, Hastak and Shaked, (2000)  and  Wang 
et al. (2004) propose a hierarchical application of risk treatment, starting with country-level 
risks, followed by market-level risk  and finally project level,  arguing that country-level 
risks influence both market-level and project-level risks, while market risks impact project 
specific risks. 
 
Conceptual political risk studies reveal that response strategies to political risks, except for 
avoidance, are fundamentally different from those described by Zhi (1995). Miller, (1992) 
describes the following generic strategic responses to political uncertainties for 
international business: avoidance, control, cooperation, imitation and flexibility, and these 
are shown in detail in Table 11. While control and cooperation strategies are aimed at 
increasing the predictability of the outside environment, the flexibility strategy increases 
internal responsiveness only (Miller, 1992; Mortanges et al., 1996). Shahid and Hood 
(2004), on JVs, cite Bradley (1977) as acknowledging the effectiveness of the control 
strategy through JVs, because historically, only 0.2% of JVs have been nationalized 
presumably because of a strong opposing local voice acting as a deterrent to government 
seizure. 
      
Another way of treating political risks is insurance against consequences of political risk. 
Buying and selling of financial instruments hedges the foreign company against exchange 
risk (Mortanges and Allers, 1996). 
 
2.5.11 Risk Monitoring and Review 
 
The following are the activities and processes in the risk monitoring and control phase of a 
project: ongoing identification; management of new risks that become known during a 
project, tracking of previously identified risks; implementation of response plans and the 
review of their effectiveness; development of remedial actions; assessing effectiveness of 




2013; Bharathy and Mcshane, 2014; Cagliano et al., 2014). The techniques employed in 
this phase include risk reassessment, risk audits, variance and trend analysis, technical 
performance measurement, reserve analysis, and meetings (Cooper et al., 2005; PMI, 
2013)  
 
    Table 11: Political environment response strategies (Miller, 1992) 
Strategy Activities 
Avoidance Divestment; delay new market entry; pursue low uncertainty niches 
Control 
Political activities e.g. lobbying for or against regulations trade restraints; gain market 
power to deter entry; influencing through advertising and promotions; exchange of 
threats; vertical integration to control input and demand uncertainties; horizontal 
mergers and acquisitions to control industry structure to control competitive 
uncertainties 
Cooperation 
Involve multilateral agreements such as long-term contractual agreements with 
suppliers or buyers; voluntary restraint of competition; alliances or joint ventures; 
franchising agreements; licensing and subcontracting arrangements; participation in 
consortia; interlocking directorates; inter-firm personnel flows 
Imitation 
An industry leader can predict response of rivals through imitation of product and 
process technologies; follow other firms in moving into new markets 
Flexibility 
Defined as the ability of the organisation to adapt to substantial, uncertain, and fast-
occurring (relative to required reaction time) environmental changes that have a 
meaningful impact on the organisation's performance. Done through: Product 
diversification; geographic diversification; and Flexible input sourcing; flexible work 
force size; flexible work force skills flexible plants and equipment; Multinational 
production  
     
2.5.12 Risk Communication and Consultation 
 
The overarching activity for risk management is communication and consultation with 
external and internal stakeholders (Cooper et al., 2005; ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013; 
Bharathy and Mcshane, 2014). According to ISO 31000 (2009), communication involves 
sharing, obtaining, and providing information to project stakeholders on all facets of project 
risk management. The modes of communication could include reports, meetings and flash 
updates. Consultation, on the other hand, involves a two-way communication process 








2.5.13 Risk Knowledge Capture  
 
Creating, maintaining, structuring and increasing knowledge are an essential part of risk 
management and act as enablers to effectively deal with the complexity of construction 
projects and they should happen during the entire project life cycle (Edwards and Bowen, 
2007; Dikmen et al., 2008; ISO 31000, 2009; Bharathy and Mcshane, 2014; Cagliano et 
al., 2014). Dikmen et al. (2008) proposed that in order to create a meaningful corporate 
risk repository, the following must form part of the knowledge captured at regular reviews, 
with the final review occurring during the project closure phase: eventuating risk; lessons 
learned about effectiveness of response strategies; relevant knowledge beyond the 
confines of the project; systemic reasons for project outcomes; what was done on the 
project, and why and how it was done; a system's vulnerability (the extent or the capacity 
of the project to respond or cope with a risk event). Part of the risk knowledge is captured 
on documents and these are reviewed next.   
 
2.5.14 Risk Documents 
 
A risk register/schedule is a document whose content includes information on risks such 
as the names of persons who logged the risks, risk ID, date of assessment and 
assumptions used, the response actions, risk owners, risk response actors, deadlines for 
response actions, risk reserves and emerging risks (OGC, 2002; Patterson, 2002; PMI, 
2013; SA/SNZ, 2013). The list is not exhaustive since it is dependent on the organisation.  
 
2.6 MICRO-POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Uncertainty that affects set objectives, is termed ‘risk’. Risk is a social construct and is 
subjective leading to different individuals seeing and interpreting risk in different ways. The 
construction industry like any other human endeavour, experiences risk in both the 
domestic and international markets. However, owing to the unfamiliar operating 
environment, international construction projects deal with more complex and diverse risks 
one of which is political risk. Political risk has been divided into country (macro) risk and 
firm or project-specific (micro) risk and while they overlap and are both important to an 
international construction project, the latter is more relevant as it directly affects the 
project. For international projects, there is empirical evidence that applying systematic risk 
management with a whole life cycle approach to the project leads to improved project 





While considerable research has been undertaken in other areas of risk assessment and 
management of international construction projects there is a paucity of research on 
political risk in general and micro-political risk in particular. Therefore, this study aims to 
contribute to research on micro-political risks by investigating the assessment of micro-
political risks, the frequency of implementation of assessment, the assessment techniques 
used, and the management of micro-political risks on international construction projects in 
Namibia. A conceptual framework of the research, based on the literature review for an 
international construction project, is shown in Figure 6. 
 
        
                                   Figure 6 : Conceptual framework for the research 
 
This research posits that applying systematic risk management to political risks, positively 
impacts on the objectives of international construction projects. The proposition framed to 
guide the direction of this study is therefore restated as follows: 
 
Micro-political risk factors impact on the performance of international 
construction projects in Namibia. 
 
It is the research process adopted for the study that will enable answers to be obtained to 
either refute or confirm the study proposition. Chapter 3 outlines the research process 
employed in seeking and providing answers to the questions concerning the assessment 












CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
To successfully test the research proposition and to achieve the objectives of the study, a 
road map for the research must be in place. Research methodology represents an 
overarching link in a system of interrelated practices and thinking that defines scientific 
enquiry (Creswell, 2003; Cohen et al., 2007; Bhattacherjee, 2012). One needs to take 
practical steps in the research journey in order to find answers to the research questions. 
Research methodology constitutes the path to finding those answers to the research 
questions; each operational step in the research process requires a choice to be made, 
from a variety of methods, procedures and models of research methodology, selecting the 
one that best enables achievement of the research objectives (Creswell, 2003; 
Bhattacherjee, 2012). Creswell, (2003) gives a concise definition of methodology by saying 
that it is the process of research. The current chapter outlines the research approach: the 
research paradigm, research design, sampling, instruments, data collection details and 
data analysis strategy employed. 
3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
Considering that political risk is considered a social construct (Lefley, 1997; Rosa, 1998; 
Edwards et al., 2005; Loosemore, 2009; Solberg and Njå, 2012), this research adopts the 
interpretivist paradigm (Rowley, 2002; Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2003; Ellinger et al., 2005; 
Bhattacherjee, 2012). Positivism and interpretivism are fundamental claims of knowledge 
known as paradigms (Creswell, 2003; Bhattacherjee, 2012). Ontology and epistemology 
assumptions shape the worldview or the research paradigm. Ontology is the nature of 
reality (Creswell, 2003). As postulated by Patton, (2015), it refers to the study of being: 
what is it that we want to know?. On the other hand epistemology is the assumption on 
how to best study the world: whether to use an objective or subjective way to learn about 
the nature of reality (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Patton, (2015) explains that an objectivist 
approach means the researcher does not get involved in what is going on in the world; the 
researcher is separated from and independent of the world. On the other extreme, the 
subjectivist approach entails the researcher being engaged, and gaining a deeper insight 
into the nature of reality of the (topic/ subject matter) by getting involved ' (Creswell, 2003; 
Bhattacherjee, 2012; Patton, 2015). Positivists claim that there is a single reality and that 




there are multiple realities and the best way to know the world is by getting directly 
involved and being subjective  (Creswell, 2003; Bhattacherjee, 2012; Patton, 2015). Within 
the  interpretivist paradigm, there are a number of research designs or methods available 
to the researcher, such as case studies, action research, ethnography, and focus group 
research (Creswell, 2003; Bhattacherjee, 2012; Patton, 2015). 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
For this study, the case study method has been adopted, and further, the suitability of this 
method supported by its use in previous political risk research studies  (Fidan et al. 2011; 
Iankova and Katz 2003; Walewski 2005; Steffey and Anantatmula 2011; Liu et al. 2013; 
Han, Park et al. 2007). As  Cohen et al. (2007) explain, a research method talks to the 
techniques and procedures used in the process of data gathering. It is the master plan of 
research that dictates the modus operandi of the study which glues it together in a logical 
way; all the major parts of the research process, namely data collection, instrument 
design, and sampling work together in addressing the research questions (Rajasekar et 
al., 1994; Leedy and Ormrod, 2010; Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
 
A case study, from a process perspective, is defined by Yin (2003) as an observation of a 
contemporary phenomenon within a bounded context. A case study design is suitable 
when pursuing the ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ questions (Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2003; Ellinger 
et al., 2005). This study seeks answers to the ‘what and ‘how’ questions of micro-political 
risk management for international construction projects in Namibia. Also case research is 
particularly relevant in studying systems, processes individuals, programmes and events in 
organisations (Rowley, 2002; Ellinger et al., 2005). The ‘case’ for this study was the 
political risk phenomenon on the project and therefore the ‘case’ could only be fully 
considered within its bounded context, namely the construction project itself.  
 
3.3.1 Case Study Protocol 
 
Yin (2003) posits that reliability and validity of case research data is enhanced by a well-
designed research protocol. The protocol consists of the case study context, the 
population of study, sampling and sample size, the methods of data collection, data 






3.3.1.1 Case study context   
 
The phenomenon of micro-political risk was investigated in a joint venture (JV) company 
whose shareholding structure was 51% Namibian-owned and 49% South African-owned. 
One partner was a wholly Namibian owned company and it owned 51% shares in the JV 
while the balance of shares were owned by the other partner registered in the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA).The Namibian partner is a property development company with 
interests in shopping malls and estate development but no experience in mass housing 
whereas the South African shareholder has extensive experience in turnkey projects and 
mass housing in their home country. The management structure consisted of a board of 
directors consisting of four board members; two from each partner. The Managing Director 
who doubled as board chairman was from the Namibian outfit with the chief operating 
officer seconded from South Africa. The South African entity was the managing partner 
vested with administrative and financial management responsibilities which meant they 
had to deploy their company systems for the running of the JV. The managing director and 
chief operating officer constituted a management committee to provide executive 
leadership to the JV. If there was a disagreement between them, then the board of 
directors would be consulted.   
The JV was established as a vehicle to participate in the mass housing programme 
(MHDP), which is a component of the fourth national development programme (NDP4) of 
the government of Namibia. According to press reports (Hartman, 2015) there was a 
housing backlog of 180 000 units in 2015. To address this backlog , the Government 
planned to construct 9306 housing units between 2014 and 2016 at a cost of N$ 2.9 billion 
in phase one of the MHDP , with a target of 180 000 units by 2030, at a cost of N$ 45 
billion. The JV was awarded a contract by a government appointed implementing agency 
to construct a variety of house types in the coastal town of Swakopmund. The project was 
to be undertaken over 33 months with 6 May 2014 as the start date and 5 February 2017 
as the completion date; the tender price was N$ 796,331,146.73. 
Employing subcontractors was adopted as the best way to implement the project. The JV 
provided all building materials for most of the trades, with the exception of, electrical work, 
plumbing, and joinery, which were supply-and-fix contracts. The objectives of the project 
included monthly revenue targets, time, quality, safety, health and environment standards, 
employment and training of Namibians, community empowerment, compliance with 




At the time of the study the project was suspended with the Government citing 
irregularities in the implementation of the MHDP as the reason for the suspension. One of 
the irregularities was said to be the lack of a proper budget for the initiative. Soon after the 
project was suspended the JV sued the implementing agency and the Namibian 
Government for failure to pay for certified work. 
 
3.3.1.2 Population of study  
 
The population of the study included senior project team members involved in international 
construction projects in Namibia;  professionals such as engineers, quantity surveyors, 
project managers, accountants, and human resource practitioners. 
 
3.3.1.3 Sampling technique and sample size  
 
A non-probability, but purposive sampling technique was employed for this study. 
Selection of this sampling method was influenced by the knowledge and experience of the 
researcher on the subject matter under study. This technique allows deliberate selection of 
particular units of the sampling frame to constitute a sample that is likely to generate useful 
data for the research (Bricki and Green, 2007).  
 
The sample consisted of ten top most officers of the JV directly involved on the project. 
The respondents in the main set of semi-structured interviews were those senior members 
of staff seconded to the project by the South African partner whose perspective on micro-
political risks underpinned the study. They included the technical director, construction 
executive, contracts manager, group manager of safety health environment and quality, 
project senior quantity surveyor, procurement manager and the site agent. The other three 
senior officials were the financial manager, assistant project manager and the liaison and 
labour relations manager. The involvement of different professions in the sample enabled 
the study to capture different perspectives on micro-political risks impacting the project. 
Also as a participant-observer and a senior member of staff, the researcher had 
participated in administering the project which allowed for a real-life and accurate portrayal 








3.3.1.4 Methods of data collection  
 
To improve the reliability of data for the study, several methods of data collection were 
used including semi-structured interviews, participant-observations, and documents as 
described in section 3.3.1.4.2 (Rowley, 2002; Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2003; Ellinger et al., 
2005; Bhattacherjee, 2012). For the interview guidelines, a pre-test was done to improve 
instrument quality. 
 
A pre-test was conducted to determine the adequacy of measures making up the initial 
semi-structured interview protocol. The questions guideline was sent to the supervisor and 
the researcher’s lecturer of risk management, for evaluation. Suggestions were made and 
one, which was implemented, involved dividing the questions into sections: about the 
respondent’s background profile, the organisation, the project, micro-political risk and 
managing political risks. Upon receiving a list of five professional colleagues of the 
lecturer, an updated question guideline was sent to each of them and one of these 
colleagues suggested the inclusion of the definitions of each micro-political risk variable 
used in this study. Although this was valuable useful suggestion, it could unfortunately not 
be implemented because of technical limitations of the software used to develop the 
interview protocols. However, verbal or written clarification was always provided to 
respondents who had queries before, during and after the interviews. 
 
3.3.1.5 Semi-structured interviews    
 
The seven respondents to the main set of semi-structured interviews were top most 
officers of the JV, but included only those seconded to the project by the South African 
partner. With all respondents connected to the project, a semi-structured interview protocol 
administered online was used to obtain the necessary information. The online interviews 
and the face-to-face interviews were held in August 2015. The follow-up interviews were 
meant to elaborate on the responses obtained in the initial interviews and these were 
targeted at specific officials namely, the financial manager, the assistant project manager 
and the liaison and labour relations manager. 
 
The main interview questions were divided into sections: questions 1–3, about the 
respondent’s background profile; questions 4–7, about organisation; questions 8–10 about 
the project; questions 11–25, about micro-political risk and question 26 about managing 
political risks. The design of the follow-up face-to-face interviews protocol were tailor made 




emphasising financial impact on objectives while for the liaison and labour relations 
manager it was focussed on community objective impacts. For the assistant project 
manager additional questions on effectiveness or otherwise of risk management systems 
were added to the main interview guidelines. The question guidelines are provided in 
Appendices C, D, E and F, where the question guideline in appendix C is for the main 
interview and those in appendices D, E and F are the ones used to gain more insight. 
 
3.3.1.6 Documents   
 
The researcher examined various documents, which provide further evidence of micro-
political risks sources, events and effects on the objectives of the project; these documents 
are described below. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from 
documents. Interviewees availed data including financial reports, newspaper cuttings, 
project status reports, minutes of project meetings, a court order and letters. To enhance 
reliability of the  study (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2003) a Microsoft Access database  was 
developed for the study 
(https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8h_zCp8QdlteTZMX1ZwemlNNU0).   
The contents of the database are defined as follows: 
 
Financial reports: A set of documents containing increased cots on the project.  
 
Publications: Press reports carrying stories about the project and/or the mass 
housing development programme  
 
Project status Report: A summary of the project performance in a given period 
against set targets of performance 
 
Minutes: A record of discussions in a meeting between the implementing agency and 
the JV  
 
Court Oder: A document issued by the Namibian High court to seal an out of court 
settlement between the JV and the Namibian Government after the JV had sued the 
implementing agency and the Line Ministry for failing to pay an amount of  N$ 100 
million for certified work. 
 
Letters: Official correspondences between the implementing agency and the JV.  
 







3.3.1.7 Participant-observation   
 
Mostly qualitative data was obtained from this data collection method. Most of the 
observations were done during the study period even though some of the information 
refers to previous observations on the project. This means that this was not an 
ethnographic study that requires a researcher to study participants for long periods of time 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). Photographs form part of the observations. The observation notes 
have been captured in the Microsoft Access database.  
 
3.3.1.8 Recording data   
 
A strong foundation for documentation of evidence gathered is critical in case research  
(Voss et al., 2002). Semi-structured interviews were conducted, clarification was given by 
the researcher when required, and feedback was solicited during interviews when deemed 
necessary (Voss et al., 2002). Following the 24-hour rule, where appropriate, 
minutes/notes were produced within the time limits set for records (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 
2003).  
 
3.4 ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER  
 
As an employee of the JV, the researcher made observations that corroborated the 
information provided by the respondents, and in other instances differed with interviewees’ 
perspectives. However, the researcher did not in any way, deliberate, or otherwise, 
influence the answers provided by respondents in this study.   Nevertheless, it is important 
to reflect on the researcher’s role in the data collection process. The possibility that as a 
participant, the biases of the researcher could have affected the research process cannot 
be denied. In defence of the researcher, it can be said that as a signatory to the 
declaration to EiR committee, everything was done to uphold ethical conduct during the 
study. On the positive side, as an employee, it made it easy for the researcher to obtain 
information because of the rapport that existed between colleagues and the researcher. 
Having been aware for some time that the researcher was studying towards a masters 






3.5 ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
As more information became available, it became apparent that the contract of the JV 
would be repudiated, which in part necessitated the follow-up semi-structured interviews 
including the discussion of the micro-political risk of repudiation. The other reason for the 
follow-up semi-structured interviews was to probe the effectiveness of the risk 
management system for micro-political risks on the project. Questions on micro-political 
risk of repudiation and effectiveness of the risk management system were part of the 
follow up elaboration interviews. The additional variables resulting from questions on 
repudiation, added depth to the study even though it required data reanalysis for some 
questions. 
3.6 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
Only the top-most officers of the JV were interviewed in the study. A semi-structured 
interview protocol administered online was used to solicit for the necessary data. Also, the 
researcher examined documents such as the court order, project status reports, minutes of 
project meetings, project letters, financial, and other records as needed.  Further, the use 
of multiple sources of data as explained above provided triangulation and improved 
construct validity (Yin, 2003). A chain of evidence was developed as the protocol was 
followed, and citations related to database material are evident in this dissertation 
(Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2003). For external validity the case protocol was strictly adhered to, 
while reliability was ensured by the development of a Microsoft Access  case study 
database (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2003) on Google drive 
(https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8h_zCp8QdlteTZMX1ZwemlNNU0). 
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
There are various methods available for the data analysis of case studies (Rowley, 2002). 
For this study, a narrative approach was adopted in accordance to Cohen et al. (2007) 
was adopted.  Thematic analysis was used for qualitative data while statistical analysis 
was used for quantitative data (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Because there were only ten 
participants,  only descriptive statistics was used (Walewski, 2005; Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
Quantitative data required coding to prepare it for input into an analysis tool or 
spreadsheet (Bhattacherjee, 2012). For this study, it involved such techniques as 
aggregating numbers into frequencies and ranking the numbers as needed. For analysis 




3.8 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
 
Every research  design  that is adopted for a study has inherent limitations (Bhattacherjee, 
2012). Generalisabity of findings poses a challenge for a case study, as the interpretations 
are limited, especially if it is a single case study as is the situation with this study (Rowley, 
2002; Choy, 2014). Additionally, a single case study research method without a  proper 
protocol may fail to meet generalisability requirements (Rowley, 2002; Bhattacherjee, 
2012). Another limitation is the fact that since micro-political risks are specific to a project it 
may make generalisability of the findings difficult (Robock, 1971; Alon and Herbert, 2009). 
Further, the use of some untested scales in the study may have impacted negatively on 









The research findings are based on the outcomes of semi-structured interviews, 
documentary information and this researcher's participation and observation as an 
employee of the JV. The participants in the study were key project team members on a JV 
project, based in the town of Swakopmund in Namibia. The aim of the study was to 
investigate micro-political risk assessment and management practices on international 
construction projects in Namibia. 
 
4.2 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
Figures 7 and 8 contain profile information about the respondents while Figures 9 and 10 
present information about the foreign shareholder and the JV. The identification and 
prioritization of risks and the management of the same follow thereafter. 
 
4.2.1 Respondents Profiles 
 
The study sought to establish the background profile of the respondents. The background 
profile revealed that the majority of respondents had more than ten years of experience in 
construction and 75% had more than 20 years of experience; this is as depicted in Figure 
7. International construction experience was below five years for all respondents. 
 
          








YEARS IN CONSTRUCTION 




In Figure 8, it is shown that all participants were senior employees  
 
          
          Figure 8: Respondent job title 
 
4.2.2 Organisational Information  
 
The study sought to understand the area of specialisation of the South African partner. 
The JV project is involved in international construction in the building sector, while the 
South African partner is involved in all three sectors of construction shown in Figure 9. 
 
           
          Figure 9: Company specialisation of foreign partner in JV 
 
The research sought to establish the type of company undertaking the international project 
in Namibian and as Figure 10 shows that three quarters of respondents thought a JV was 










Technical Director Quantity Surveyor Project Manager 









          
         Figure 10: Performing organisation 
 
4.2.3 Data Analysis 
 
The data gathered from responses to questions 11 to 26 on the main interview protocol 
directly address the objectives of the study and that data is used in data analysis for the 
study. 
 
4.2.3.1 Key micro-political risks 
The study sought to identify the key micro-political risks impacting on an international 
construction project and Figure 11 depicts the percentage of respondents selecting each 
micro-political risk shown based on its likelihood of occurrence. It shows that 62% of the 
listed risks were considered as likely to occur by all respondents. The micro-political risks 
of expropriation and local ownership requirements got the least response at 60%. 
               
              Figure 11: Percentage of respondents selecting a micro-political risk 
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Figure 12 gives the risk profile of the JV under study and Table 12 shows the equivalent 
international project risk assessment (IPRA) elements and micro-political risk variables. 
Since the median is the most suitable measure of central tendency, it was used for 
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 II.B31 II.D4      
2 II.A8  II.D61  II.B32       
1   II.B1        
 A B C D E E D C B A 
 Impact (on project objectives  e.g. cost, time, scope or quality) 
Key 
 Extreme  Severe  Moderate  Low  Negligible 
     Figure 12: Micro-political risk profile for the JV 
 
Just below 50% of the micro-political risks assessed make up the key risks and are located 
in extreme and severe zones. The risk assessment sheet is provided in Appendix G.  Each 
of the thirteen micro-political risks is separately discussed below using evidence from the 
other sources of data as per the protocol (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2003) taking into 
consideration that in theory the construct of risk has the attributes of a source, an event, 
effects, time of occurrence, and time of exposure to the consequences (Edwards and 














     Table 12: Micro-political risks and IPRA equivalents 
 




1 Contract Problems II.D4 Extreme Yes Gvt 
2 Hostile Press II.C2 Extreme Yes Society 
3* Labour Unrest II.B31 Extreme Yes Society 
4* Anti-project Demonstrations  II.B32 Severe No Society 
5 Local Ownership Requirements II.A3 Severe Yes Gvt 
6 Restrictions on Expatriate Employees III.D1 Severe Yes Gvt 
7* Bribery II.D61 Moderate No Gvt 
8* Corruption II.D62 Moderate No Gvt 
9 Delay in approval of permits II.A7 Moderate Yes Gvt 
10 Discriminatory Taxation II.A7 Moderate No Gvt 
11 Expropriation II.B1 Moderate No Gvt 
12 Repudiation II.B4 Moderate Yes  Gvt 
13 
Profit remittance and exchange 
controls 
II.A8 Negligible Yes Gvt 
Note: The  relationships  are  established for the researcher to use relative impact values only in the IPRA tool (Walewski, 
2005) for risk analysis. For each risk element in the IPRA tool, there are attributes attached to it in the element description 
data sheets and it is these attributes that are matched with identified micro-political risks. The need for equivalence arose 
because of the use of different words used in the IPRA structure to those for the identified micro political risks. 
Equivalence would then enable the adoption of a relative impact value in IPRA to analyse micro-political risks.  This was 
done to avoid using untested values for the relative impact in calculating the levels of the identified micro political risks. 
Using this approach, more than one micro-political risk may be equivalent to one IPRA element. For example ‘Labour 
Unrest’ and ‘Anti-project Demonstrations’ are more closely related and therefore fall under the same IPRA element hence 
they are listed as II.B31 andII.B32 respectively. The same applies to ‘Bribery’ and ‘Corruption’ which are denoted as II.D61 
and II.D62 respectively.. 
*The subscript shows that there are two or more micro-political risks equivalent to one IPRA element. 
Gvt = Government   
 
 
4.2.3.1.1 Repudiation risk 
 
All ten interviewees attested to the presence of the repudiation risk. The source of the risk, 
according to the Government, was the mishandling of MHDP by the implementing agency. 
Further documentary evidence of the risk came from actions of the Attorney General who 
representing the Namibian Government, in a written speech on 25 August 2015 (see 
Database and Records) presented in Windhoek to the MHDP contractors, he said, among 
other things: 
 
I must reiterate that the Government of the Republic of Namibia remains committed 
to developing a comprehensive, affordable and sustainable housing plan across the 
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country….This objective can however not be achieved in the manner of execution of 
the Mass Housing Development Programme under the National Housing Enterprise. 
The cancellation event occurred as part of a Court Order  signed on 21 August 2015 in 
case number I 1940/15 (see Database and Records) at the main division of the High Court 
of Namibia. Clause 2.1 reads: 
The Plaintiff and Second Defendant shall enter into a construction agreement that 
shall extinguish, override and replace the Contract agreement that exists between 
the Plaintiff and First Defendant.  
Note: The ‘Plaintiff’ refers to the JV and the ‘Second Defendant’ is the Namibian 
Government. 
Clause 2.2 is telling and it reads: 
The construction agreement referred to under Paragraph 2.1 above shall confine 
itself to the completion of commenced-but-incomplete houses. 
Documentary evidence shows that the repudiation risk resulted in serious financial 
implications for the project; with a massive negative impact on the project revenue which 
ignoring variation orders, reduces contract price from N$ 796 million to an estimated–   
N$ 360 million – a 55% reduction.  
The objective of community empowerment was affected as evidenced by the letter of 8 
June 2015 (see Database and Letters), written by JV management responding to the 
suspension of the project; the last paragraph reads: 
…we wish to point out the socio-economic impact of a prolonged suspension on the 
community, of Swakopmund in particular our subcontractors, and suppliers. We 
have currently 55 labour only and 7 supply and fix subcontractors with a combined 
labour force of 1300 on site. We have 27 Suppliers in and around Swakopmund and 
Walvisbay, and spend around N$ 15 million on supplies and N$ 5 million on labour -
only subcontractors per month. The withdrawal of such monthly spends on the 
community of Swakopmund and Walvisbay will have significant negative impact on 




Interviewee C indicated that some corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects, such as 
building a boundary wall for one of the schools in Swakopmund, were abandoned due to 
reduced revenues affecting empowerment efforts. 
 
4.2.3.1.2 Contract problems risk 
 
Failure to honour certified work resulted in a series of letters written by the JV 
management to the implementing agency and in one such letter  dated 4 March 2015 (see 
Database and Letters), and expressing concern about payment claim which was overdue 
by 81 days, contained the following words: 
 
Up to date the JV (real name) has not received the outstanding amount of                      
N$ 26 963,325.06 and with no clear confirmation when we will receive the 
outstanding payment. 
 
The CEO of the implementing agency acknowledging responded, in part, in a letter dated 
12 March 2015 (see Database and Letters) stating the following: 
 
Please accept my apologies for the delays in settling the amount of                        
N$ 26 963 325.06. We are engaged with the line Ministry and private financial 
institutions to raise the funds needed to settle this overdue bill. 
  
A final-demand letter of 22 April 2015 (see Database and Letters), before the matter was 
handed over to the JV’s lawyers, read in part: 
 
Despite our repeated requests for payment & the ………… persistent non-payment, 
we now have no option but to demand payment of the outstanding amount of  
N$ 69, 496, 206.50 (incl. VAT) within 7 days from the date of this letter, failing which, 
we will have to exercise our contractual & legal rights in terms of the General 
conditions of Contract for Construction Works (Second Edition) (2010) (herein 
referred to as “GCC2010”) and common law….We urge you to use this final 
opportunity to pay the overdue amounts on or before 30 April 2015 in order to 
prevent termination of our agreement due to repudiation & breach of contract as per 
clause 9.3.11.2 of GCC2010. 
 
A letter written by the CEO of the implementing agency and dated 4 June 2015 (see 
Database and Letters) announced the suspension of the MHDP had serious 





In execution of this Ministerial directive, I have been authorised by the …. Board of 
Directors to instruct you to temporarily suspend the works as per ministerial directive 
with immediate effect. 
 
As a participant-observer (see Database and Observer) the researcher had direct 
knowledge of the risk and its consequences. Also in all the three follow-up interviews 
conducted with  A, B,  and C, contractual problems arising from breach of contract and 
non-payment, were confirmed. The effects of the risk were insufficient materials on site 
and reputational damage attracting punitive action as indicated in a letter from a supplier, 
dated 13 January 2015 (see Database and Letters): 
 
We have received numerous orders for phase 2 of the project as well as a request 
for immediate manufacture and supply of trusses. Although we understand the 
situation in which you current (sic) find yourself due to nonpayment by ….., we 
regrettable (sic) cannot at this stage continue with the supply of materials to you until 
payment has been received. 
 
Interviewee A provided evidence of the impact on cost , revealing that by the end of June 
2015 the project had incurred substantially increased costs (see Database and Financials) 
due to contract problems. Evidence of the impact of suspending the project on the 
empowerment objective resides in the letter of 8 June 2015 (see Database and Letters) as 
already discussed in section 4.2.3.1.1. The effect on time was contained in a letter to the 
implementing agency dated30 June 2015 (see Database and Letters) to the implementing 
agency reading in part: 
 
..We do, however wish to note that the current extension of time at this stage is in the 
order of 6 working months… 
 
4.2.3.1.3 Labour unrest risk 
 
Subcontractors’ workers engaged in industrial action nearly every month end because of 
either late or non-payment. In a newspaper article quoting the MD of the JV the workers’ 
dilemma was captured as follows: 
 
Recent work stoppages that delayed the work for one or two days were due mainly 





Further evidence is provided in nearly all minutes of project progress meetings, for 
example, in the minutes of Meeting number 04, item 9.3:  
 
Over the last two months there were work stoppages/go-slow from the 
subcontractors’ workers due to nonpayment. The JV lost 2 weeks of work as a 
result. 
 
The labour unrest risk had effects on the time objective which was evidenced in the project 
status report of April 2015 (see Database and Records):  
 
The project is behind schedule mainly due to non-payment by employer. This is 
despite having 49 building subcontractors on the project. 
 
Further evidence of schedule problems was provided in minutes of progress Meeting 
number 07, item 9.2 (see Database and Minutes), which says: 
 
Delays continue to bedevil the project because of payment delays or nonpayment by 
Client. AS will continue to communicate with …. on EOT (extension of time) due to 
these delays.  
 
Evidence of the impact of delays on the project can partly be shown by failure to meet the 
revenue budget of  the project as the project status report of April 2015 (see Database and 
Records), shows by way of the financial graphs. As a participant-observer (see Database 
and Observer), the researcher was aware of the other impacts such as on the reputation of 
the JV when subcontractors’ workers vented their frustration. 
 
 
4.2.3.1.4 Hostile press (public opinion) risk 
 
The main-stream media, more so newspapers   (see Database and Publications), would, 
with regularity, carry the following or similar headlines: “Messy, messy housing affair” 
(Immanuel, 2015a); “Govt fails housing target” (Immanuel, 2015b); “Mass housing 
progress but problems persist” (McClune, 2014); “Mass houses vacant at Swakopmund” 
(Hartman, 2015).  
 
The objective mainly impacted, was reputation, as an excerpt from a letter of 20th April 





…we unfortunately have to put your order on hold. The reason for this is we have 
identified all …. funded developments as a high risk for none payment… 
 
Interviewee C, referring to the press, said: “There was no good publicity at all.” The same 
sentiments were expressed by interviewee B who claimed that the bad press was fuelled 
by jealousy and rumours. As a participant-observer (see Database and Observer), the 
researcher witnessed some subcontractors, or their skilled workers, leaving because the 
image of the project was not good.   
 
In a typical risk-flow mapping by Simon (1984) the flow of risk was two way; the first route 
was host media-to-host society-to project and the second route was host media-to-host 
government-to-project creating negative public opinion. 
 
4.2.3.1.5 Delay in permit approval risk 
 
Delay in permit approvals was meant to cover all project-related approvals by the central 
or local government, including the ones that were cancelled after approval. Approval 
delays at government level were to do with township establishment approvals by the 
Township Board, for the new areas allocated to the JV for construction. The CEO of the 
local authority, one year after applications were made to the Township Board, had this to 
say in the national press (see Database and Publications): 
 
Until the statutory processes are finalized we will not be able to service these houses 
(Hartman, 2015). 
 
Evidence at local authority level indicates that the approval of building plans and permits 
was often delayed.. As an observer, the researcher was aware of the local authority 
attempting to halt the project advancing the reason that the plans were not approved. Yet 
the plans had been submitted well in advance of construction, which afforded the local 
authority ample time to scrutinise and approve the plans.  It took the Regional Governor’s 
intervention to stop the local authority from stopping construction.  
 
Documentary evidence of approval delays was found in minutes  of progress Meeting 
number 08 held on 16 April 2015, item 8.2 (see Database and Minutes) in which the 
engineer’s representative stated that the local authority personnel claimed that no plans 




approval fees for those house plans were paid on 28 August 2014 (see Database and 
Records). 
 
4.2.3.1.6 Restrictions on expatriate employees risk 
 
Like many other governments the Namibian Government issues work permits to foreigners 
to work in the country (see Database and Records). 
 
Evidence exists that some employees of the South African partner, seconded to the 
project, were denied work permits. As observed at the time of writing this dissertation, the 
current site agent submitted a work permit application and was turned down.  
 
Impact of the risk was the quality objective as evidenced by the July 2014 project status 
report which on page 4 (see Database and Records), under Risk Management reported: 
 
..The other risk which raised its ugly head was the shortage of supervisory staff on 
our side as well as on the subcontractors’ side. The risk on our side can to a large 
extend (sic) be treated by approval of work permits. 
 
As an opportunity, this risk allowed Namibians to fill some positions in the JV and that 
achieved one of the project objectives, namely skills transfer.  
 
4.2.3.1.7 Profit and forex remittance restrictions risk 
 
From the interviews, remittance restrictions received a low rating. It was discovered from 
interviewee A that there is a surtax of 5% on dividends paid to foreign companies.  
 
4.2.3.1.8 Local ownership requirements risk 
 
Documentary evidence was found in a prequalification document in item number           
1.8: Special conditions; first bullet (see Database and Records), of with the 51%–49% 
criterion as one of the prerequisites.  
 
100% Namibia (sic) owned companies or joint ventures (51%–49%) shareholding in 
favour of the Namibian owned companies) are invited. 
 
Further evidence is provided in the share certificates (see Database and Records) of the 
JV where the shareholding structure is shown. From observation, it is well known that the 
majority shareholder is a Namibian company is well known. 
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As an opportunity, this risk allowed a Namibian company which did not have the requisite 
capacity both in terms of skills and financial muscle, to participate in a new area of 
business and benefit from skills transfer. 
4.2.3.1.9 Anti-project demonstrations risk 
No documentary or observational evidence was found on this risk. 
4.2.3.1.10 Discriminatory taxation risk 
No further evidence on discriminatory tax risk could be discovered in any of the sources 
accessible 
4.2.3.1.11 Corruption risk 
It was difficult to get evidence on corruption on the project without documentary evidence. 
However, from a participant-observer perspective, the researcher was aware that 
corruption was experienced on the project. 
4.2.3.1.12 Bribery risk 
Despite absence of documentary evidence, from a participant-observer (see Database and 
Observer) perspective, the researcher was aware that bribery took place on the project. 
4.2.3.1.13 Expropriation risk 
No further evidence on expropriation risk could be discovered in any of the sources 
accessible this risk was not experienced. 
4.2.3.1 Project life cycle phases and micro-political risks 
The study sought to determine which phase of the project life cycle was affected most by 
micro-political risk. The number of micro-political risks present in each phase of the project 
life cycle (concept, feasibility, design and development, execution and handover) was used 
as the measure.  Figure 13 shows that micro-political risks were at their maximum density 
in the execution phase while corruption was pervasive throughout the PLC. There is a 
trend of the numbers of risks increasing from concept phase of project life cycle and 




         
           Figure 13: Project life cycle phases and micro-political risk  
 
4.2.3.2 Risk assessment techniques 
 
One of the research objectives was to examine the assessment techniques used for micro-
political risk. Figure 14 shows that, among the respondents, qualitative methods were 
preferred to scientific quantitative ones. The researcher observed that only judgment and 
intuition by management were used on the project. 
 
         
         Figure 14: Micro-political risk assessment techniques 
 
4.2.3.3 Timing of micro-political risk assessment  
 
Finding out when risk assessment was undertaken on the project was one of the 
objectives of the study. Figure 15 depicts that the majority of the respondents (87%) were 
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made. The number of respondents who were of the opinion that assessment was done at 
the time that bid/no-bid decisions were made, was equal to the number of respondents 
who felt risk assessment was continuous. However, documentary evidence does not show 
continuous assessment but rather a “static” risk schedule (see Database and Records). 
Additionally, interviewee C who disagreed with the findings of the main and initial set of 
interviews argued that risk assessment was done on an ad hoc basis. As a participant-
observer (see Database and Observer), the researcher was aware that risk assessment 
was at best ad hoc and not systematic. No further evidence was found to show that 




Figure 15: When risk assessment is implemented 
 
4.2.3.4 Micro-political risk response strategies 
 
The study sought to establish the response strategies used to manage micro-political risks 
on international construction projects in Namibia. The best way of combating micro-
political risk, according to the respondents, was to follow the strategy of cooperation as a 
response strategy to risk; this is shown in Figure 16.  However, this strategy was used in 
conjunction with other strategies. Evidence from other sources on the cooperation strategy 
includes the JV Company founding statement (see Database and Records) where partial 
foreign ownership is indicated. 
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         Figure 16: Micro-political risk response strategies 
 
Also, the control strategy was used, on two occasions, when a press conference and a site 
visit were arranged for the national broadcaster with several other media outlets in 
attendance. One of the newspapers  (see Database and Publications) for a change, had 
for its headline: “Company Excels in Swakopmund Mass Housing Project” and went on to 
write: “ The JV has made an example by constructing low cost housing ahead of schedule”  
(Repin, 2014). While agreeing that cooperation, control, and insurance had been 
employed, interviewee C, when interviewed, added: “relationships played a big part”. From 
the researcher’s observation, this phrase most likely pointed to the existence of good 
relations between the majority shareholder and influential office bearers in central and 
local government, facilitating mitigation, if not elimination, of some of the political risks on 
the project. 
 
4.3 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
Findings from previous research, which was based on large-scale surveys and on a more 
rigorous methodology, will be used for comparison even though it is acknowledged that 
this study is not at the level of that previous research, comparison can still be illustrative 
and even indicative. The study found that there were key micro-political risks that impacted 
on the project and that these were assessed irregularly and managed mainly through the 
cooperation strategy. Also part of the findings was that micro-political risks were at their 
peak numerically during the execution phase of the project life cycle. The findings will be 
discussed in line with the objectives of study.  
 

















4.3.1 Key Micro-political Risks in International Construction in Namibia 
 
One of the objectives of the study was to identify key micro-political risks impacting on 
international construction projects in Namibia. Using the risk profile of the JV as shown in 
Figure 12 and considering the ‘moderate’ to ‘extreme’ zones, there are nine micro-political 
risks that arise from the host government while three are generated by the host society 
(Simon, 1984). Initial discussion of the micro-political risks will be on the key risks and 
these will be compared to previous studies on political risks. This will be followed by a 
discussion on the impact of the key micro-political risks on the objectives of project. 
 
The risks in the severe and extreme zones require immediate action while the moderate 
zone will require further investigation of causative factors. Based on that six key threat 
micro-political risks were identified and these are contract problems, hostile press and 
labour unrest in the extreme zone, anti-project demonstrations, restrictions on expatriate 
employees and local ownership requirements in the severe zone. However, local 
ownership requirements and expatriate labour restrictions were also opportunity risks on 
the project. Owing to these two upside risks, employment of Namibians, either as 
subcontractors or direct employees of the JV, was made possible, which in turn supported 
another project objective of training and skills transfer. 
 
The moderate rating of the micro-political risk of repudiation is of concern, considering its 
devastating effects on the project (see financial impact below). However, the answer 
perhaps lies in the managerial perception of risk as explained by Al Khattab et al. (2007). 
stressing that if the likelihood of occurrence of a political risk is low, but its impact is high, 
the managerial concern about such a risk can be low as well. That maybe explains the 
assignment of the impact baseline value of A in the IPRA tool.  
 
In rating risks in terms of probability of occurrence, the respondents in this study were 
equally concerned about the political risk arising both from the government and host 
society unlike the study by Al Khattab et al. (2007) in Jordan, where respondents were 
more concerned about political risk arising from the host society than that arising from the 
host government. According to  Al Khattab et al. (2007), at the time of their study, the 
Middle East was experiencing high levels of societal upheaval. Evidence seems to suggest 
that the prevailing environment in a host country may influence the micro-political risks and 
consequently the risks will change in tandem with changes in the host society’s conditions 




prevailing peace and social harmony has resulted in a balanced outlook, suggesting both 
government and the society contribute equally as sources of micro-political risks on 
international construction projects in Namibia.  
 
For comparison purposes, five of the six key risks (contract problems, labour unrest, anti-
project demonstrations, restrictions on expatriate employees, and local ownership 
requirements) were also identified as key risks by Mortanges and Allers (1996) in their 
study of Dutch firms operating in developing countries. The similarities may show that 
there is some degree of commonality in micro-political risks in projects despite the 
observation that a list of political risks cannot be drawn that would fit every situation, as 
argued by Kobrin (1979)  and Akinci and Fischer (1998).  
 
There was no evidence of any anti-project demonstration risk experienced on the JV 
project, but it is suspected, that some respondents considered it similar to labour unrest 
and rated its probability of occurrence higher than deserved.  
 
4.3.2 Impact of Key Micro-political Risks on Project Objectives 
 
Making use of the evidence available, micro-political risks are discussed in this subsection 
according to the project objectives they affect. The discussion is based on data collected in 
line with the case study protocol and discussed in detail in Sections 4.2.3.1.1 through to 
4.2.3.1.13. These documents include information on project finance, minutes of project 
meetings, project letters, publications (press reports) other project records, participant 
observer’s notes and interviews available via a link provided in this dissertation in sections 
3.3.1.4.2 and 3.6. 
 
4.3.2.1 Financial impact 
 
Micro political risks, which were linked to financial effects, are repudiation, contract 
problems and delay in permit approvals. Repudiation led to a revenue loss of around       
N$ 436 million, a loss of projected profit of N$ 60 million and dividend loss. At repudiation, 
the project had realised revenues totalling N$ 246 million and revenue from the completion 
of unfinished units was determined at N$ 114 million–giving total revenue of N$ 360 million 
against the tender price of N$ 736 million. The contract problems risk led to a cost 
increase of N$ 3 million by June 2015 due to interest charges and forfeited discounts. The 
micro-political risks of contract problems and permit approvals delay also caused lags in 
cash flow. 
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4.3.2.2 Impact on reputation 
Micro-political risks that impacted on the reputation of the JV included repudiation, contract 
problems, labour unrest, and a hostile press. Cancellation of a contract tarnishes the 
image of a construction contractor and may scuttle future opportunities. Failure to pay 
creditors timeously, industrial action by subcontractor workers, and ensuing bad press all 
emanated from contract problems. Bad press and negative public opinion could have been 
triggered by the micro-political risk of labour unrest. Public opinion fuelled by a hostile 
press could have played a part in contract repudiation. Bad press caused damage to the 
reputation of the JV and fuelled public opinion against the mass housing development 
programme as a whole.  
4.3.2.3 Impact on empowerment 
Empowerment of the local community was negatively impacted by the micro-political risks 
of repudiation and contract problems. Repudiation would result in premature direct loss of 
1300 jobs, while contract problems caused suffering to the workers and the local 
community targeted by the empowerment objective. 
4.3.2.4 Impact on schedule 
At the end of June 2015, the project was behind schedule by 6 months being as a result 
of the micro-political risks of contract problems, labour unrest, delay in permit approvals, 
and restrictions on expatriates. Non-payment as a contract problem caused delays when 
workers went on strike. A shortage of materials due to cashflow problems, worsened 
schedule delays. Delays in approving permits stopped the JV accessing certain sites in 
order to start construction as planned thereby contributing to overall schedule delays. It 
can be argued that expatriate labour restrictions led to the employment of supervisors with 
limited skills, which in turn led to poor quality work requiring rework, and therefore causing 
delays on the project.  
4.3.2.5 Impact on quality 
Using the broad definition of quality as satisfying the needs of a customer who is defined 
from an internal and an external perspective, it can be argued that, in a way, all the micro-
political risks in a way could have impacted the objective of quality (Juran, 1998; Rose, 




problems, expatriate restrictions and local ownership requirements.  The JV may have 
promoted the use of poor quality materials by buying cheaper and poorer quality 
alternatives because of a scarcity of money resulting from contract problems. Technical 
skills are in short supply in Namibia and being denied work permits for foreign workers; the 
JV was forced to employ locals with lower skills, negatively impacting quality. The local 
majority ownership requirement enabled the local shareholder to dominate the 
subcontractor selection process resulting in cronyism and the appointment of under-
qualified subcontractors with negative results on quality. 
 
One of the key findings is that the micro-political risk of contract problems affects all 
discussed objectives meaning it is a serious threat risk (it has an impact value of E, which 
is the highest value on the assessment sheet; see Appendix G). Managers need to closely 
and continuously monitor and control such risks.  
 
The discussion on effects on objectives lends credit to the risk-path model developed by 
Eybpoosh et al. (2011) for international construction projects. That there are links among 
micro-political risks in that more than one micro-political risk impact on an objective has 
been demonstrated. In the risk-path model (Eybpoosh et al. 2011), following two risk 
paths, namely unfavourable contract conditions micro-political risk and  country conditions 
micro-political risk, will lead to conflicts with project stakeholders, delays and disruptions, 
lags in cash flow, and ultimately, in cost overruns.  
 
4.3.3 The Project Phase Prone to Micro-political Risk 
 
The objective of the research was to determine which phase of the project was most likely 
to be affected by micro-political risk, and it emerged that the execution phase of an 
international construction project in Namibia, was the most prone.  The finding was that the 
number of micro-political risks, affecting a phase, increases progressively during the 
project life cycle; the respective phases with the number of relevant risks shown in 
brackets are: concept (5), feasibility (8), design and development (9), execution (12) and 
handover (9).  
 
One way to explain the phenomenon is from an uncertainty point of view (Ward and 
Chapman, 2003; Mosaic, 2010a; Hillson, 2014a). For example Ward and Chapman (2003) 
and Cagliano et al. (2014) have argued that uncertainty is at its maximum in the concept 
phase, and progressively decreases along the PLC as more information and knowledge 




Chapman, (2003) agree that the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the execution 
phase increases uncertainty. The fact that stakeholders may have multiple, and most of 
the time conflicting objectives, and interests adds to the ambiguity about roles and 
responsibility (Ward and Chapman, 2008).  
 
It means as the PLC stages progress an uncertainty that was not resolved in earlier stage 
is understood and can be treated as risks or uncertainty that matters (Hillson, 2012a). By 
the same token, an increasing understanding of the project environments, both external 
and internal, including identifying stakeholders with some degree of precision and by 
execution stage, most of the “knowable unknowns” become “known unknowns” or risks 
that can be managed through the risk management processes (Ward and Chapman, 2003; 
Mosaic, 2010a); this could be one possible explanation of the distribution of micro-political 
risks as shown in Figure 13. At handover there is less uncertainty, more project knowledge 
and decreasing numbers of stakeholders and correspondingly exposure to the micro-
political risk dwindles. 
 
Also, it could be argued that since the perspective of the respondents is shaped by their 
experience as construction professionals, they cannot accurately determine the risks in the 
other phases of the project life cycle. Normally in a design-bid-build project delivery 
system, the construction company gets involved in the execution and handover of the 
asset only. It would therefore follow that with many years of experience in those project 
phases they were able to identify many micro-political risks affecting an international 
construction project in Namibia. 
 
The corruption risk appears in all the project life cycle phases, making it the most 
pervasive of the micro-political risks. Despite a moderate risk level prioritisation, it impacts 
on objectives throughout the phases of the project and therefore may have a huge 
aggregate impact. For instance, the aggregate impact on the project objective of cost is an 
increased and distorted cost of construction; corruption therefore negatively impacts 
development especially in emerging economies (Comeaux and Kinsella, 1994; Moura et 
al., 2011).  
 
Irrespective of the explanation, the lesson learnt from the relationship between PLC 
phases and the corresponding applicable risks, is that political risk management should be 
at its peak during the execution phase of the project. For project managers involved in the 




Chapman, 2003; Li and Zou, 2008). Ward and Chapman (2003) state that by undertaking 
risk assessment at conception and at salient points such as at stage interphases enables 
participants to consider the impact of their decisions with regard to the overall risk profile of 
the entire PLC. The CII, (2003b) asserts that the PLC approach to risk assessment 
removes ‘compartmentalization’ where participants in different PLC phases consider only 
their objectives in isolation. 
 
The evidence seems to support the IPRA tool implementation strategy as advanced by the 
CII (2003b), at critical points as shown in Figure 3 because it takes into account the 
changing risk profile of the PLC (Figure 13) to enhance project performance. A number of 
other researchers have argued for the implementation of risk management throughout the 
PLC  (Ward and Chapman, 1995, 2003; Raz et al., 2002; Han et al., 2008; Cagliano et al., 
2014) 
 
4.3.4 Risk Assessment Methods on International Construction Projects 
 
The objective of the study was to establish risk assessment methods used for micro-
political risk on international construction projects in Namibia. It was found that highest 
preference was for company specific techniques (63%), followed by heuristic techniques. 
The same number of respondents (50%) respectively picked the scenarios technique and 
the judgment and intuition of managers technique, and a quarter of the respondents chose 
a standardised checklist, while only 13% deferred to expert opinion. Scientific techniques 
and the Delphi technique were not used. These findings are aligned  to those by 
Mortanges and Allers (1996) in the Netherlands, and those by Al Khattab et al. (2011) in 
Jordan that, for political risk assessment, advocated the use of heuristic techniques in 
preference to scientific quantitative techniques. Al Khattab et al. (2011) and four other 
earlier studies that they cited, showed the same bias towards qualitative methods of 
political risk assessment; the four other studies mentioned were done in Canada (Rice and 
Mahmoud, 1990), USA (Subramanian et al., 1993), Turkey (Demirbag and Gunes, 2000) 
and Sweden (Kettis, 2004).  
 
The preference for heuristic techniques is because they are quicker, simpler and cheaper 
to use (Al Khattab et al., 2011). The main reasons why scientific techniques are avoided, 
relate to complexity and the need to train users to operate models employing  advanced 
statistical methods (Mortanges and Allers, 1996). In some countries the quality of input 




media and possible manipulation and obsolescence of the data (Prakash and Luther, 
1986; Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Al Khattab et al., 2011). Reflecting a lack of confidence 
in the media as source of political risk information, Kobrin et al. (1980)  and Mortanges and 
Allers (1996) found that only 10.3% and 35%, respectively, of respondents considered 
newspapers, and TV and radio as important sources.   
 
This evidence supporting a preference for qualitative techniques points to a gap between 
practice and theory in project risk management, since according to Hillson (2015) and  Li 
et al. (2013) risks arising from variability (aleatoric uncertainty) cannot be adequately 
handled without the use of quantitative probabilistic distributions. 
 
4.3.5 Timing of Risk Assessment 
 
With regards to when assessment was done, strategic planning was the choice made by 
most respondents (85%) with the continuous and bid/no bid stage having equal scores of 
57%. The option of ‘when risk is imminent’ was never used. The results confirm the 
findings in studies by Kobrin et al. (1980) and Mortanges and Allers (1996), in which 
assessment was linked to an event requiring action. The findings of the former study were 
that 80% of the respondents undertook political risk assessment at the time of strategic 
planning and the latter study established that 74% of respondents linked assessment to 
overseas investment. Fitzpatrick (1983) concluded that political risk assessment was 
mainly an ad hoc process. 
 
It was difficult to reconcile that almost 60% of the respondents indicated assessments 
were systematically utilised in day-to-day operations, with the failure of the JV to meet 
most of the set objectives of revenue, cashflow, reputation, empowerment and shareholder 
value. Also, paradoxically, the resulting failure of the JV tends to contradict evidence from 
previous research linking project risk management with project success (Mills, 2001; de 
Bakker et al., 2010, 2012; Zwikael and Ahn, 2011). In the face of overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary, this result may be explained by the need for self-preservation and bias on 
the part of participants. 
 
As external and uncontrollable risks (Simon, 1984; Sharma, 2013) which cannot be 
eliminated, the identified key micro-political risks require proactive assessment, close and 
continuous monitoring, as well as mitigation when possible (Zhi, 1995; Lam et al., 2007; 
Sharma, 2013); this is in line with contemporary thought in project risk management (de 




experience of the researcher on this project brings to the fore the crucially important role of 
proactive and continuous risk assessment on international construction projects in 
Namibia.  
 
4.3.6 Risk Management Strategies on International Projects 
 
Political risk assessment is undertaken with the aim of enabling management to put in 
place protective or compensating measures (Howell, 2014).  The study findings on risk 
management strategies are discussed in this section.  
 
It emerged from the study that all the respondents favoured cooperation as a strategy, 
while about 40% of the respondents respectively said the project used strategies of 
control, and private insurance, and 13% of respondents picked public insurance. These 
findings are in alignment with a previous study by Mortanges and Allers (1996) whose 
findings were: good citizenship abroad (43%), cooperation (35%), avoidance (17%), 
control (17%), use of global trade marks (22%), private insurance (26%) and public 
insurance (35%). In their study, cooperation was in joint second place, showing that it is 
one of the preferred response strategies. Unlike in this present study, use of public 
insurance was popular in the study by Mortanges and Allers (1996).  
 
Political risk insurance, covers assets against expropriation, contract repudiation and 
currency devaluations (Al Khattab et al., 2007; Howell, 2014). Using public insurance 
forces governments and their affiliates to think twice before engaging in actions or events 
that could generate micro-political risks, because claims could be made against the 
government institution. As mentioned by interviewee C,  relationships management is an 
important response mechanism against micro-political risk; this is  supported by Conway 
(2013).  Prakash and Luther (1986) and Al Khattab et al. (2015) note that in responding to 
micro-political risk, a greater effort should be made by the leadership of projects to work 
out differences with host governments.  
 
Zhi (1995) in proposing risk responses, indicated that not many of the political risks could 
be transferred to another party such as the architect, owner or subcontractors which brings 
to the fore the need for political insurance when faced with micro-political risks (Howell, 
2014). Contract problems can be insured under a contractor’s all-risk policy, while the 
other four (labour unrest, expatriate restrictions, repudiation, and delay in permits 
approval) can be covered under political risk insurance policy (Howell, 2014). Micro-




insurance would be included in the tender price, thereby increasing the cost of executing 
the construction project in particular and national development in general.  
 
4.4 SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
 
In summary, the findings of the research indicate that the objectives of the study were met. 
Six key threat and two opportunity micro-political risks affecting international construction 
projects in Namibia, were identified. It emerged from the study that the execution phase 
was most prone to micro-political risks, that risk assessment was done in an ad hoc 
manner using qualitative (heuristic) methods, and that cooperation (that is, joint ventures) 
was the most preferred risk response or management strategy.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the study was to examine micro-political risks and to establish how these risks 
were managed on international construction projects in Namibia. To achieve this aim the 
following study objectives were set: to identify the key project-specific micro-political risks 
affecting international construction in Namibia; to determine the phase of the project most 
prone to political risk; to establish the political risk assessment methods used on 
international construction projects in Namibia, and; to identify the strategies used in 
managing political risks on international construction projects in Namibia. An international 
construction project based in Swakopmund in Namibia was used for the case study and 
the findings are summarized next. 
5.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The research findings suggest that key threat micro-political risks affecting international 
construction projects in Namibia were repudiation, contract problems, labour unrest, a 
hostile press, and delays in permit approvals, while local ownership requirements and  
expatriate labour restrictions were not only threat risks, but opportunity risks as well. Of the 
micro-political risks identified, a significant number came from the host government and 
lesser number were from the host society. Evidence gathered, indicated that international 
construction contractors were equally concerned about host society- and host government-
related key risks on international construction projects in Namibia. 
Concerning the phase of the PLC most affected by micro-political risks, the execution 
stage had the highest number of micro-political risks. Evidence tended to show a trend 
where micro-political risks progressively increased in number from concept phase, 
reaching a maximum during the execution phase of the PLC, before decreasing in the 
handover phase.  
As for assessment techniques, company-specific methods were employed most often, 
followed by heuristic techniques such as intuition and judgment by management, 
scenarios development and standardised checklists. It was also found that the Delphi 




Coming to implementation of risks assessment, there was evidence to show that risk 
assessment was event linked and ad hoc.  
 
It emerged that for risk response, or management strategies, the cooperation strategy 
such as use of joint JVs was the most preferred one. The study indicated that both public 
and private insurance were needed on an international construction project in Namibia.  
 
The negative impact of micro-political risks on the objectives of the project indicated that 
all was not well with the risk management system used. Therefore it is safe to conclude 
that, some facets of systematic risk management were not used in dealing with the micro-
political risks on the project, resulting in failure to achieve the project objectives with regard 
to time, financial, quality, reputation, empowerment and shareholder value and thus 
confirming the research proposition made. 
 
5.3 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on findings of the study, the conclusion is that the objectives of the study were 
achieved. The study was conducted to identify key micro-political risks in international 
construction in Namibia, assessment techniques, implementation of assessment, and 
strategies used to manage those risks. The findings of this study corroborated those from 
previous studies on political risk in international business (Kobrin et al., 1980; Mortanges 
et al., 1996; Al Khattab, 2011; Al Khattab et al., 2011). Even though it was not a direct 
objective of the study to establish a relationship between risk management and project 
performance, the research provides insights into the negative effects of ill-managed micro-
political risks on international construction projects. Empirical evidence from this study 
suggested that without systematic risk management, project objectives are difficult to 
achieve. It is also concluded that there existed a gap between practice and theory in risk 
assessment techniques used for micro-political risk management. 
 
5.3.1 Validation of the Research Proposition 
 
Evidence showed that micro-political risk impacted the project objectives of international 
construction in Namibia. It emerged in the study that the micro-political risks which 
materialised on the project, had impacted on the project objectives related to time, cost, 
cashflow, quality, reputation, empowerment, and shareholder value. From interviews and 




N$ 3 million, and a revenue loss of N$ 436 million, respectively attributed to the 
manifested micro-political risks of contract problems, and repudiation. Therefore, the study 
validated the proposition, which states: 
 
Micro-political risk factors impact on the performance of international construction 




With the aim of streamlining and improving the risk management process on international 
construction projects in Namibia, recommendations are put forward in the subsections 
which follow, and they emanate from the findings of this case study. However, limitations 
arising from findings of a single case study are acknowledged, as recommendations based 
on the study may not be applicable to all international construction projects in Namibia. In 
addition, the knowledge gained from previous studies on best practice, in risk assessment  
and management in general  (CII, 2003a,b; Ward and Chapman, 2003; Walewski, 2005; 
ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013), and in political risk in particular  (Kobrin et al., 1980; 
Mortanges et al., 1996; Al Khattab, 2011; Al Khattab et al., 2011), has been incorporated 
in making the recommendations below.   The recommendations are aligned and limited to 
the objectives of this study. 
 
5.4.1 Risk Assessment 
 
The risk assessment process includes risk identification, analysis and evaluation (ISO 
31000, 2009). Risk assessment is therefore very important as it lays the foundation for risk 
management. On that basis it is recommended that a risk management framework be 
established to guide the process and allow periodic tracking and auditing to establish the 
efficiency of the process (ISO 31000, 2009; PMI, 2013). Recognising that different types of 
uncertainties give rise to diverse micro-political risks which require different assessment 
approaches, it is recommended that both qualitative (heuristic) and quantitative scientific 
methods be used in order to attain the  maximum benefits of micro-political risk 
management on international construction projects in Namibia (Mortanges et al., 1996). 
This objective can be realised if researchers and industry-representative bodies promote 
the use of these methods in all the different fora, whenever possible. Because multiple 




risk paths and networks; the use of risk-path models such as the one developed by 
Eybpoosh et al. (2011) is recommended when undertaking risk assessment.  
 
5.4.2 Project Life Cycle Phase Prone to Micro-political Risk 
 
With micro-political risk at its peak during execution phase, it is recommended that project 
managers continuously scan both the internal and external environment for emerging 
micro-political risks, while managing the ones already assessed (Robock, 1971). In 
addition, the risk management effort as a whole needs adequate resourcing during the 
critical execution phase of the project life cycle. 
 
5.4.3 Implementation of Risk Assessment 
 
Planned regular implementation of risk assessment is recommended considering that the 
political environment is dynamic as are the emanating micro-political risks. One such  risk 
assessment  implementation framework is that recommended by the Construction Industry 
Institute (CII, 2003a,b; Walewski, 2005); this framework is presented as Figure 3 in this 
study, and shows the salient points at which  risk assessment should be undertaken during  
the project life cycle.  
 
5.4.4 Micro-political Risk Management Strategies 
 
Recognising that political risks are subjective and that they arise from actions or lack of 
actions of people with power, a stakeholder relationship management approach as 
proffered by Wang et al., (2004), is recommended to manage micro-political risks. As 
stated by interviewee C, in the JV investigated, relationships played a big part in risk 
management. However this approach can be implemented using the specific political risk 
response strategies of control and cooperation (Miller, 1992). Finally, international 
construction contractors will be well served by having private insurance against political 
risk, which will avoid the scenario of this case study where the contractor had no 
alternative, other than to sue the Namibian Government in order to seek compensation for 
losses incurred because of micro-political risk, which became a reality. 
 
5.5 AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study, in addition to contributing to an understanding of the management of micro-
political risk on international construction projects in Namibia, has also created a need for 




case studies on micro-political risk involving, a number of international construction 
projects in Namibia, be conducted. In addition, research on the micro-political risks in each 
phase of the project life cycles of international construction projects, with only the 
participants in each phase as respondents, is necessary to build on the findings of this 
study. The results for each phase can then be aggregated to produce a single micro-
political risk profile for the entire project life cycle. Another research area is that of 
developing a micro-political risk-path model by establishing the interaction of micro-political 
risk sources, events, and effects, on project objectives. A study to compare the 
effectiveness of qualitative and quantitative methods in risk assessment of micro-political 
risks in international construction projects, is likely to give deeper insight into micro-political 
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APPENDIX A:  
 




The purpose of this study is to identify key micro-political risks, implementation of 
political risk assessment and assessment techniques on international construction 
projects in Namibia. Micro political risks arise from political activity by governments 
(host or home) and its agencies and host-society and international activists and these 
risks directly impact the performance of international construction projects. These risks 
impact project objectives of time, cost, quality, safety, environment and customer 
satisfaction but can be managed resulting in improved performance of an international 
construction project.  An empirical study involving data collection and analysis will be 
conducted using semi-structured interviews conducted with you.  
 
The data collected from the survey and interviews, will be treated with utmost 
Confidentiality and the sources will be known only to the researcher. To emphasise the 
anonymity of your participation, you will be referred to as “participant A” or “participant 
B” etc. in the research report. Participation in this study is voluntary so please feel free 
to reject the opportunity to partake, if you so desire. If you do participate and wish to 
withdraw at any time during your participation, you are welcome to do so. Should you 
participate in this study, the following outcomes and benefits for the study will be 
realized: Insight into micro-political risk management by contractors on international 
construction projects in Namibia; identification of key micro-political risks impacting 
project objectives, implementation of risk assessment, knowledge of assessment 
techniques and adopted risk response strategies.  
 
Should you require any information throughout or before the process of completing the 
interview, please feel free to contact or prompt the Researcher. The researcher aims to 
conduct the study in a careful and thoughtful manner to ensuring that the data 
capturing, display and analysis processes are completed at no risk for the participating 
organisation. It is encouraged that the parties to the study sign a confidentiality 
agreement as specified by the participant organisation, should this be deemed 
necessary. A copy of the findings can be provided to you for scrutiny by your 
organisation should you deem this necessary and should you so wish. 
91 
I, Isaac Muchenga, undertake to safeguard the data collected, by treating it as 
confidential and by referring to the organisation as “the JV” and the 
participant as Interviewee “A” or B etc. 
I,……………………………............................. (print name), am fully aware of the aim, 
motivation, and purpose of this study and disagree/agree (delete inapplicable) to 
participate in this study. 
Signed at …………………………on this the ……………..day of……………………… 
Participant:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Researcher:…………………………………………Email: isaac.muchenga@uct.ac.za or 























































Political Risks Structured Interview A 
5. 
6. 
Does the company have an effective framework to effectively deal with the 
identified risks and their impact 
Tick all that apply. 
D Yes 
D No 
What would you suggest as probably the best way to deal with the finacial risks 
that the project has encountered 
Powered by 
I Google Forms 
Page 2 of2 


























Managing Political Risks on International Construction Projects in Namibia 
4. 
5. 
Kindly indicate the level of likelihood of occurrence on a scale of 1-5 of project 
specific political risks you may have experienced on your project ( where, 
1=Rare; 2=Unlikely;3=Possible; 4=Likely; 5= Almost Certain) 
About the political risks 
Mark only one oval per row. 
Corruption 
Bribery 
Delay in approval of permits 
Labour unrest 
Profit remittance and exchange 
restrictions 
Discriminatory taxation 




Local Ownership Requirements 
Hostile press (bad image) 
Restrictions on number of 
expatriate employees 
Repudiation 
2 3 4 5 
The risks experienced or identified had/will have the following impacts 
About effects of risks 
Mark only one oval per row. 
Strongly 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree disagree 
Costs 0 0 0 0 0 
Time 8 8 8 8 8 Quality 
Safety Health & 0 0 0 0 0 Environment 
Reputation 8 8 0 8 0 Revenue C) C) 
Profit 0 0 0 0 0 
Community 0 0 0 0 0 Empowerment 
Legal Compliance 0 0 0 0 0 
Shareholder Value 0 0 0 0 0 Dividends 
Page 2 of6 
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Kindly indicate the phase(s) of the project life cycle (PLC) in which the project 
specific political risk of CORRUPTION is likely to occur 
About the political risks 
Tick all that apply. 
D Concept 
D Feasibility 
D Design & Development 
D Execution 
D Handover 
Kindly indicate the risks as identified above that would be found in the 
CONCEPT phase of the project life cycle (PLC) 
About the political risks and PLC 
Tick all that apply. 
D Repudiation (Cancellation) 
D Contract Problems (Breach) 
D Labour Unrest 
D Bad Press 
D Delay in permit approvals 
D Profit Remittance & exchange restrictions 
D Local Ownership Requirements 
D Corruption 
D Bribery 
D Anti-Project Demonstrations 
Kindly indicate the risks as identified above that would be found in the 
FEASIBILITY phase of the project life cycle (PLC) 
About the political risks and PLC 
Tick all that apply. 
D Repudiation (Cancellation) 
D Contract Problems (Breach) 
D Labour Unrest 
D Bad Press 
D Delay in permit approvals 
D Profit Remittance & exchange restrictions 
D Local Ownership Requirements 
D Corruption 
D Bribery 
D Anti-Project Demonstrations 
Page 3 of6 


























APPENDIX G:  
 
Study JV- Micro-political Risk Assessment  
 
IPRA Risk Assessment Sheet 
CATEGORY 
Likelihood of Occurrence (L) Relative Impact (I) 
Baseline L , I Comments  Very low                                                         Very high Negligible  
Extreme 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E 
II.A.TAX/TARIFF               
II.A3. Legal entity 
establishment 
    X       B 4, B 
 
II.A7. Corporate  income tax    X        B 3, B  
II.A8. Miscellaneous tax    X         A 2, A  
II.B.POLITICAL               
II.B1 Expropriation  X          C 1, C  
II.B31 Social unrest/violence 
(Labour unrest) 
  X         D 2, D 
 
II.B32 Social unrest/violence 
(Anti-project demonstration) 
   X        D 3, D 
 
II.B4.Repudiation     X       A 4, A  
II.C. CULTURAL   X         D 2, D  
II.C2. Public opinion (Hostile 
press) 
    X       D 4, D 
 
II.D. LEGAL               
II.D4 Contract type and 
procedures 
   X        E 3, E 
 
II.D61 Corruption   X         C 2, C  
II.D62 Corruption (Bribery)   X         C 2, C  
III.A. PROJECT SCOPE               
III.A7. Approvals permits and 
licensing 
   X        B 3, B 
 
III.D1. Workforce availability 
and skill 
    X       C 4, C 
 
Likelihood of Occurrence  
NA - Not applicable to this project. Zero 
1 - Very Low chance of occurrence, rare and occurs only in exceptional circumstances. (<10% chance) 
2 - Low chance and unlikely to occur in most circumstances. (10% chance of occurrence <35%)  
3 - Medium chance and possible to occur in most circumstances. (35% chance of occurrence <65%) 
4 - High chance of happening and will probably occur in most circumstances. (65% chance of occurrence <90%) 
5 -Very High chance of occurrence and almost certain and expected in most circumstances. (90% or greater chance of occurrence) 
  
Relative Impact 
A Negligible consequence that routine procedure would be sufficient to deal with the 
consequences. 
B Minor consequence that would threaten an element of the function.  
C Moderate consequence would necessitate significant adjustment to the function 
D Significant consequence that would threaten goals and objectives; requires close management.  


















IPRA Relative Impact Baseline Values (CII, 2003b) 
Rank Order of IPRA Risk Elements by Relative Impact, Extreme and Severe Elements 
Rank IPRA Element Element Description 
Baseline Relative 
Impact* 
1 I.B1 Source and form of funding E 
2 I.B3 Estimate uncertainty E 
3 I.A1 Business case E 
4 I.B4 Insurance E 
5 I.A2 Economic model /feasibility E 
6 I.B2 Currency E 
7 II.B6 Relationship with government/owner E 
8 I.A4 Market /Product E 
9 II.C1 Traditions and Business practice E 
10 II.D4 Contract type and procedures E 
11 II.B2 Political stability D 
12 II.B3 Social unrest/violence D 
13 II.E1 Trained workers D 
14 I.A6 Operations D 
15 II.A1 Scope development process D 
16 I.A5 Standards and practices D 
17 IV.A1 Operational Safety D 
18 III.C1 Design Engineering process D 
19 I.A3 Economic Incentives/barriers D 
20 I.A7 Tax and tariff D 
21 II.C2 Public opinion D 
22 II.B5 Government participation and control D 
23 IV.A4 Hiring/training/retaining D 
24 II.D3 Governing law/contract formalities and language D 
25 II.C3 Local design services D 
26 II.B3 Subcontractors D 
27 II.D5 Environmental permitting D 
* Levels of relative Impact:
E = Extreme and would stop achievement of functional goals and objectives
D = Significant and would threaten goals and objectives
